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In February 2002, when the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR)
brought the first habeas cases challenging the Executive's right to detain
prisoners in a law free zone at Guantanamo, almost no legal
commentator gave the CCR much chance of succeeding. Yet, two years
later in 2004, after losing in both the District Court and Court of
Appeals, the Supreme Court in Rasul v. Bush2 handed us a resounding
victory. Four years later, the Supreme Court again ruled in our favor in
2008 in Boumediene v. Bush, holding that the detainees had a
constitutional right to habeas and declaring the Congressional statute,
which stripped them of that right, unconstitutional. For the first time in
American history, the Court had struck down a wartime national security

1. Bessie McKee Walthour Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh Law School,
President Center for Constitutional Rights. I would like to thank my research assistants
Janet Checkley and Bret Grote for their valuable assistance on this article, and my
colleagues at the Center for Constitutional Rights, Wells Dixon, Baher Azmy and
Michael Ratner for their insights into the Guantanamo issues. I would also like to thank
Wayne State for both the invitation to present this article as a lecture at Wayne State and
for their assistance. I would also like to thank the Document Technology Center at the
University of Pittsburgh for their assistance.
2. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
3. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
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measure enacted by Congress. Numerous commentators termed these
Supreme Court cases "landmarks."4 We had won, or so we all thought.
Now, another four years have passed, and our great victories have
not achieved the result we desired. The litigation, of course, had an
enormous impact, resulting in hundreds of Guantanamo prisoners being
released.5 Yet despite Obama's promise to do so, Guantanamo is still not
closed and more than a decade after the first detainees were brought to
Guantanamo, almost 170 prisoners still languish there.6 Many of the
lawyers, scholars, and advocates involved in the litigation are deeply
disappointed and feel - as Joe Margulies, the lead counsel in Rasul v.
Bush puts it - that "[he] now looks back on Rasul as a failure."7
In a recent New Republic article titled, "The Great Legal Paradox of
Our Time: How Civil Libertarians Strengthened the National Security
State," Harvard Professor Jack Goldsmith, a former Bush administration
official, goes a step further. He argues that while the CCR's Hail Mary
Rasul lawsuit produced a famous Supreme Court victory, it not only
failed to achieve the results CCR hoped for, but ultimately helped cement
and legitimate the counterterrorism policies that Bush introduced and
Obama ultimately continued.' According to Goldsmith, by challenging
the government's authority, CCR ironically ended up strengthening it.9
While the Supreme Court has imposed restraints on executive power,
Goldsmith argues that the courts have approved of "extraordinary
presidential powers in the long war against terrorists," particularly the
"remarkable fact" that, as we pass the 11th anniversary of the
4. Baher Amzy, Executive Detention, Boumediene and the New Common Law of
Habeas, 95 IOWA L. REv. 445, 450 (2010); Stephen I. Vladeck, The Case Against
National Security Courts, 45 WILLAMETrE L. REv. 505, 506 (2009); Noah Feldman, Who
Can Check the President?,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2006, at 55.
5. Muneer I. Ahmad, Resisting Guantanamo: Rights at the Brink of
Dehumanization, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 1683, 1754 (2009).
6. Jack Goldsmith, The Great Legal Paradox of Our Time: How Civil Libertarians
Strengthened the National Security State, NEW REPUBLIC (Mar. 16, 2012), available at
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/101561/guantanamo-bay-prison-obama. (hereinafter Goldsmith, The GreatLegal Paradoxof Our Time).
7. Joseph Marguilies & Hope Metcalf, TerrorizingAcademia, 60 J. LEGAL EDUC.
433, 471 (2011) (commenting further, Margulies and others do not regret their decision to
bring a lawsuit on behalf of the Guantanamo detainees, for "[a]t that moment there was
no choice but to litigate. He would do it again tomorrow, were the circumstances the
same."). See Kim Lane Scheppele, The New Judicial Deference, 92 B.U. L. REv. 89, 94
(2012) (arguing that, "despite winning their legal arguments, suspected terrorists lose the
practical battle to change their daily lives."). See also Aziz Z. Hug, What Good is
Habeas?, 26 CONsT. COMMENT. 385 (2010) (recognizing that Boumediene's actual
impact on detainee cases is relatively limited).
8. Goldsmith, supra note 6.
9. Id.
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September 1 1th attacks, the Obama administration is preventively
detaining almost 170 prisoners at Guantanamo without charge or trial,
and almost 2,000 more in Afghanistan.'o That this practice of long-term
preventive detention is now generally accepted as lawful and legitimate
is, in Goldsmith's account, at least partly a result of the CCR lawsuits."
Goldsmith recognizes that Rasul and Boumediene had an important
restraining impact on the government and aided the detainees.12 Clearly,
the release of six or seven hundred of the nine hundred imprisoned at
Guantanamo was a huge accomplishment, as was aiding a global
movement to make Guantanamo a matter of important public debate.14
Nevertheless, Goldsmith also quotes Michael Ratner, the president of the
CCR, during the last decade and the inspiration behind the Guantanamo
litigation, as believing that while they won courtroom battles, the CCR
thus far has lost on their broader arguments: "We lost on the enemy
combatant issue ... on the preventive detention issue, more or less, ...

[and] on the military commission issue, more or less."05 For Goldsmith,
"[p]aradoxically, and to Ratner's regret, his victories in court and
elsewhere helped Barack Obama to legitimate counterterrorism policies
that Ratner sought to end."' 6 And most ironically, according to
Goldsmith, "[a] decade after the GTMO detention facility began its life
as a creature of presidential unilateralism, it and the...legal decisions it
spawned stand as a testament to the power of modern wartime checks
and balances."' 7
In certain respects, Goldsmith's account is relatively easy to critique.
He ignores the reality of the injustice that still exists at Guantanamo.
Guantanamo is not a testament to the power of wartime checks and
10. Id. See also Bagram: The Other Guantanamo? (CBS News broadcast Nov. 13,
2011) ("There are now 3000 alleged insurgents detained in Bagram, five times as many
[around 600] as when President Obama took office [in January 2009]."). The article
discusses an agreement that the United States and Afghanistan negotiated on prisoner
transfer, where many of the Afghan prisoners held in Bagram would be eventually
transferred to Afghan control, however, the scope of the agreement is still unclear, and at
minimum, the non-Afghan prisoners, many of whom were undoubtedly captured outside
of Afghanistan, would remain in United States control. See also Rod Nordland, U.S. and
Afghanistan Agree on Prisoner Transfer as Part of Long-Term Agreement, N.Y. TIMEs,
Mar. 10, 2012 at A9.
11. Goldsmith, supra note 6.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Jack Goldsmith, POWER AND CONSTRINr THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER
9/11, 163 (2012).
17. Id.
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balances, but it has been and remains a symbol of unlawful oppression
and injustice. For example, Goldsmith claims, in part, that because of the
court's rulings, "a decade after 9/11 nearly two hundred dangerous
terrorists remain at GTMO, legitimately and with relatively little
controversy, in military detention without trial."" Goldsmith simply
ignores the reality of the 86 Guantanamo prisoners, more than half the
remaining total, the U.S. Defense Department and State Department has
approved for transfer or release because it would be "consistent with the
national security and foreign policy interests of the United States."l 9
These prisoners nonetheless remain indefinitely, perhaps forever,
detained at GTMO because of the failure of checks and balances to
protect human rights.20
Thus, while Goldsmith touts the Guantanamo litigation as evidence
that the system works, that errors are corrected, and that the Imperial
Presidency is no longer very imperial at all but instead accountable, he
ignores the tremendous suffering that still exists at Guantanamo. One all
too tragic example of this continued suffering is represented by Adnan
Latif, the Yemeni man who on September 8, 2012, became the ninth
prisoner to die at Guantanamo.21 As the detainee's lawyer has stated,
pending an investigation by the U.S. military, although we do not know
exactly how Mr. Latif died, "he died because he was there."2 2
18. Id. at 231.
19. The White House, Executive Order--Review and Disposition of Individuals
Detained at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base and Closure of Detention Facilities (Jan.
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/Closure
22, 2009),
Of Guantanamo DetentionFacilities/; Editorial, America's detainee problem, L.A.
TIMES (Sept. 23, 2012), available at http://articles.latimes.com/2012/sep/23/opinion/laed-detention-20120923; Andy Worthington, Guantanamo Scandal: The 40 Prisoners
Still Held, but Clearedfor Release at Least Five Years Ago, TRUTHOUT, (June 8, 2012),
availableat http://truth-out.org/news/item/9668-guantanamo-scandal-the-forty-prisonersstill-held-but-cleared-for-release-at-least-five-years-ago (commenting that "[o]ne of the
greatest injustices at Guantanamo is that of the 169 prisoners still held, over half - 87 in
total - were cleared for release by President Obama's interagency Guantanamo Review
Task Force"; that figure is now down to 86 with the death, presumed to be by suicide, of
one of the detainees cleared for release or transfer).
20. See David Frakt, GuantanamoDetainees: The 'Other' Victims of 9/11, JURIST FORUM (Sept. 20, 2012), available at http://jurist.org/forum/2012/09/david-fraktguantanamo-detainees.php. See also David Frakt, Prisoners of Congress: The
Constitutionaland Political Clash Over Detainees and the Closure of Guantanamo, 74
U. PITr. L. REV. 1 (2012).
21. Carol Rosenburg, Dead Guantanamo detainee won, then lost court-ordered
release, MIAMI HERALD, (Sept. 11, 2012), available at http://www.miamiherald..
com/2012/09/l1/2996888/dead-guantanamo-detainee-won-then.html.
22. Ben Fox, The Big Story: Dead prisoner had troubled history at Guantanamo,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 11, 2012), available at http://bigstory.ap.org/article/
guantanamo-prisoner-who-died-battled-confinement.
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However, Goldsmith's analysis does raise important and deeper
questions about the role of law reform litigation generally and the CCR's
Guantanamo litigation more specifically. Goldsmith is certainly correct
that many in the human rights community are deeply disappointed by
what has transpired since the Supreme Court decided Rasul and
Boumediene. Under the Obama administration, the practice of wartime
preventive detention of captured suspected terrorists has been continued
and legitimated. When the CCR first initiated the Rasul litigation, we
believed that captured suspected terrorists were entitled to be charged
and given a fair, criminal trial under the constitution's legal processes.
We were opposed to a wartime emergency preventive detention model
for dealing with suspected terrorists. We still hold that view. However,
that is not what has happened, despite our victories in the Supreme
Court.
Moreover, even the habeas review that the CCR won has turned out
to be quite limited. In Rasul and Boumediene, the Supreme Court issued
what were procedural, jurisdictional opinions, holding that the federal
courts had jurisdiction to hear the detainees' habeas claims, but
addressing almost none of the detainees' substantive issues, such as what
legal standards applied to the detentions.23 The Court left it to the lower
courts, in this case the D.C. Circuit and district courts, to fill in the
substantive and evidentiary standards by which habeas review would be
decided.24 The D.C. Circuit, which was reversed twice by the Supreme
Court in the Guantanamo litigation, has proven to be an implacable foe
of meaningful review.25
This Article will explore and explain how and why the CCR's
landmark victories in the Supreme Court have resulted in disappointment
and will address the question that Goldsmith's analysis raises: has the
Guantanamo litigation simply legitimated permanent military preventive
detention? In doing so, it will place the Guantanamo cases and post-9/ 11
litigation in a broader context of rights-based courtroom challenges to
injustice, exploring the dilemmas and advantages of such litigation,
ultimately concluding that Goldsmith's analysis misses a key aspect of
the Guantanamo litigation.
Part I of the Article explores how the lower courts have limited
Boumediene's ruling. Part II analyzes the deeper question of the lower
court's acceptance of the military preventive detention paradigm in the
conflict with al Qaeda, and why that paradigm is problematic. Part III
23. E.g., Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the "War on Terror," 108
COLUM. L. REv. 1013 (2008).
24. See generally, id.
25. See generally, id.
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addresses the underlying reasons why the Supreme Court victories have
led to the dashed hopes, continued injustice, and disappointment that
characterizes the current situation in Guantanamo. This section locates
the Guantanamo litigation in a broader context, illustrating how both
domestic U.S. courts and other national legal systems have often, in
similar contexts, followed the same trajectory. It argues that the real
problem with the Guantanamo litigation lies in the failure of rights to
fulfill their promise without a strong political movement pushing those
rights forward. Both victory and defeat have to be judged in a broader
frame than just what happens in the courtroom battle. The concluding
part challenges Goldsmith's account that the Guantanamo litigation's
main role was to legitimate the Bush/Obama system of preventive
detention, arguing that rather than simply playing a supporting role in
Goldsmith's well-oiled system of checks and balances and Presidential
accountability, litigation of this sort can and often does also serve as a
mechanism of long-term resistance to an oppressive system.
I. BOUMEDIENE'S NARROWING BY THE LOWER COURTS

The Supreme Court's rhetoric and language in Boumediene soared,
with Justice Kennedy writing for the Court that "[s]ecurity subsists, too,
in fidelity to freedom's first principles. Chief among these are freedom
from arbitrary and unlawful restraint and the personal liberty that is
secured by adherence to the separation of powers." 2 6 But the Court's
opinion was also quite narrow and procedural. As the Court repeatedly
emphasized, "our opinion does not address the content of the law that
governs petitioners' detention." 27 Moreover, in many respects, the
functional test that Justice Kennedy articulated in Boumediene was in
tension with its lofty rhetoric and justification of his opinion.28
The Supreme Court left it to the lower courts to fill in the myriad of
substantive and evidentiary issues that it had not addressed and to apply
the vague functional test to other situations. The D.C. Circuit, to which
the Guantanamo litigation has been directed, has been hostile to the
detainees, with several of the judges on the Circuit publicly criticizing

26. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 797.
27. Id. at 798.
28. See Jules Lobel, Fundamental Norms, InternationalLaw, and the Extraterritorial
Constitution, 36 YALE J. INT'L L. 307, 316-18 (2011) (discussing Justice Kennedy's
functional test at odds with the separation of powers rationale and rhetoric in the
opinion).
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the Supreme Court's Boumediene opinion as having created a "mess"
and as a "charade." 29
First, the Circuit has held that the federal courts are without power to
order the release of Guantanamo prisoners into the United States, even
where those prisoners were indisputably not enemy combatants, and
where they could not be repatriated to another country, leaving no other
remedy. 30 For example, Kiemba v. Obama involved Uighur prisoners,
members of a Muslim minority group in northwestern China, whose fight
had been with the Chinese government, not the Americans. 3 Although
they had no connection whatsoever to al-Qaeda or the Taliban, the
Uighurs were, nonetheless, detained in Pakistan by the U.S. military due
to information provided by Pakistanis, who were eager for reward
money.32 After being shipped to Guantanamo, the government
recognized early on that they were not enemy combatants of the United
States and could not be detained as such.
Most of the Uighurs were not, however, released from Guantanamo,
because they could not be returned to China where they would
undoubtedly be jailed or persecuted by the Chinese government, and no
third country would take them. 34 Finally, a short time after Boumediene,
the D.C. Circuit held in Parhatv. Gates that the Uighurs could not be
legally detained as enemy combatants.35
When the government did not seek certiorari in the Supreme Court,
the Uighur prisoners filed habeas petitions in the District Court, seeking
release into the United States because there was no basis for their
continued detention at Guantanamo and no third country to send them to
where they would not be subject to persecution.36 Moreover, religious
29. Editorial, A Right Without a Remedy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2011, at A26, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/01/opinion/01 tue l.html (quoting Honor
able A. Raymond Randolph, Justice Story Distinguished Lecture Address at the Heritage
Foundation: The Guantanamo Mess (Oct. 20, 2010)); Esmail v. Obama, 639 F.3d 1075,
1078 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Silberman, J., concurring); Stephen 1. Vladeck, The D.C. Circuit
After Boumediene, 41 SETON HALL L. REv. 1451,1453-54 (2011).
30. Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2009), vacated, 130 S.CT. 1235
(2010), rehearingen banc denied, reinstatingjudgment as amended; Kiyemba v. Obama,
605 F.3d at 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
31. Id. at 1023-24.
32. Id.
33. Qasim v. Bush, 382 F.Supp.2d 126, 127-28 (D.D.C. 2005) (noting military
tribunal's holding that Uighur detainees could not be detained as enemy combatants).
34. Id. at 128.
35. Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.2d 834, 854 (D.C. Cir. 2008). That case was decided under
the mechanism that Congress had established for review that was struck down in
Boumediene.
36. Id. at 852.
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and other humanitarian groups in the United States agreed to sponsor and
take care of the Uighurs if released into the United States.37
District Judge Urbina granted the Uighurs' habeas corpus petitions
and ordered their release into the United States subject to conditions set
by the Court.3 ' The D.C. Circuit reversed, holding that federal judges had
no power to grant the relief requested absent explicit legislative
authority. 39 The Circuit furthermore held that to the extent the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment might bar the indefinite
detention of someone whom the government had no legal basis to detain,
it did not apply to non-citizens detained at Guantanamo. 40 The Circuit
simply ignored Boumediene, treating it as only applying to habeas
jurisdiction and not substantive rights.4 1
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Kiyemba,42 but vacated that
grant and remanded to the Circuit in light of the Obama administration's
filing that the detainees had received a resettlement offer, which might
moot the controversy.43 On remand, the D.C. Circuit reaffirmed its prior
ruling, and this time the Supreme Court denied certiorari."
Thus, as a practical matter, the detainees are left without any
meaningful remedy and judges who find no basis for detention typically
instruct "the [g]overnment to take all necessary and appropriate
diplomatic steps to facilitate the [prisoners'] release forthwith.',4 As one
Circuit Judge candidly recognized, the Circuit has reduced habeas review
to essentially rendering "virtual advisory opinions"46 or as The New York
Times put it, "the appellate court has all but nullified that view of judicial
37. See Bill Delahunt & Sabin Willett, Innocent detainees need a home, BOSTON
April 2, 2009, available at http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial
opinion/oped/articles/2009/04/02/innocent detainees need a home/ ("The small UighurAmerican community has pledged to aid the detainees with jobs and housing"); see also
Matthew Barakat, D.C. Uighurs wait to take in Gitmo detainees, USA TODAY, October
10, 2008, available at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-10-10187008770 x.htm?csp=34.
38. In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, 581 F.Supp.2d 33 (D.D.C. 2008).
39. Kiyemba 555 F.3d at 1027-29.
40. Id. at 1026-27.
41. Id. at 1028.
42. Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 458 (2009).
43. Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010) (per curiam).
44. Kiyemba v. Obama, 605 F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1631
(2011).
45. See, e.g., Ahmed v. Obama, 613 F.Supp.2d 51, 66 (2009); Basardh v. Obama, 612
F.Supp.2d 30, 35-36 (D.D.C. 2009). See Jonathon Hafetz, Calling the Government to
Account: Habeas Corpus After Boumediene, 57 WAYNE L. REv. 99, 131-35 (2011) (for
an excellent discussion of the Kiyemba ruling). See also Vladeck supra note 29, at 147685 (discussing remedies in Habeas cases after Boumediene).
46. Esmail v. Obama, 639 F.3d. 1075, 1078 (D.C. 2011) (Silberman, J., concurring).
GLOBE,
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power and responsibility backed by Justice Kennedy and the court
47
majority" in Boumediene.
As of January 1, 2013, there are still 166 prisoners detained at
Guantanamo. 8 Of these, 86 have been approved for transfer or release,
which means that the Department of Defense has determined that they
need not be detained at Guantanamo.49 Of these 57 are Yemenis whose
government has agreed to repatriate them.50
Yet, as of January 2013, these detainees have not been transferred to
Yemen or the other countries where they are from for several reasons.
First, in December 2009, under mounting political pressure, the Obama
administration imposed a blanket moratorium on transferring
Guantanamo detainees to Yemen.5 ' Moreover, Congress has enacted
legislation in the past two years that rendered it difficult, albeit not
impossible for the Obama Administration to transfer a Guantanamo
detainee.5 2 The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2012
prohibits the use of Defense Department funds to transfer to or release in
the United States any non-citizen held at Guantanamo.sa Congress also
has imposed onerous certification requirements for a transfer from
Guantanamo to a foreign country, such as the Executive certifying that
the receiving state indeed meets certain national security standards.54
Additionally, the Courts have thus far refused to allow any remedial
action, with the district courts and the Circuit effectively holding that
they do not have the power under habeas to order the government to
transfer the detainee either to the United States or to any other country.5
The upshot is that there are many detainees who should not be at
Guantanamo, but are nonetheless imprisoned there indefinitely.
Second, the Circuit has established evidentiary standards and
presumptions that have made it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible,
47. Editorial, A Right Without a Remedy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2011, at A26.
48. Charlie Savage, Guantanamo Prison Revolt Driven by Inmates' Despair, N.Y.
TIMES, April 24, 2013, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/25/us/
guantanamo-prison-revolt-driven-by-inmates-despair.html?pagewanted=all.
49. Id.
50. Andrei Scheinkman et al., The Guantanamo Docket - Citizens of Yemen, N.Y.
TIMES, (2012), http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/country/yemen.
51. Baher Azmy, The Face of Indefinite Detention, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2012,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/14/opinion/life-and-death-at-guantanamobay.html; Andy Worthington, Does Obama Really Know or Care Who is at
Guantanamo?, TRUTHOUT, June 10, 2010, available at http://archive.truthout.org/doesobama-really-know-or-care-about-who-is-guantinamo60321.
52. See infra notes 52 and 53 and accompanying text.
53. National Defense Authorization Act § 1027 (1st Sess. 2012).
54. National Defense Authorization Act § 1028 (1st Sess. 2012).
55. Supra note 30.
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for detainees to win habeas claims. For example, the Circuit reversed a
district court's factual finding that the government had not demonstrated
that a Yemeni citizen imprisoned at Guantanamo since 2002 was an
enemy fighter.56 The Circuit Court held that the district court had failed
to accord the government's intelligence report a presumption of
regularity. 57 The Circuit majority reached this conclusion despite the fact
that the report contained inaccuracies, was produced in a stressful and
chaotic situation and by a clandestine method that was never explained,
was filtered through interpreters, subject to transcription errors, and
heavily redacted for national security purposes. As Judge Tatel argued
in a strong dissent in the Latif v. Obama case, "it is hard to see what is
left of the Supreme Court's command in Boumediene that habeas review
be 'meaningful."' 59
The Court of Appeals has also made clear its view that the
government's evidence need not meet a particularly stringent standard.
The Circuit has assumed arguendo that the government must meet a
preponderance of the evidence standard because the Obama
administration has maintained that preponderance was "appropriate."6 o A
unanimous panel in Al-Adahi v. Obama, however, expressed doubt that
habeas review "requires the use of the preponderance standard."61 In a
subsequent case, Esmail v. Obama, Judge Silberman wrote that he
thought the preponderance standard is "unrealistic," and candidly
doubted that "any of [his]colleagues will vote to grant a petition if he or
she believes that it is somewhat likely that the petitioner is an al-Qaeda
adherent or active supporter." 62 The standard Silberman thought he and
his colleagues were prepared to accept was the very low "some
evidence" standard.63 As Professor Stephen Vladeck noted, Silberman's
opinion could fairly be read as suggesting that he - and at least some of
his colleagues - are in fact reviewing the government's case only for
"some evidence" rather than the "more evidence than not' requirement
of the preponderance standard.64
The D.C Circuit's evisceration of the Boumediene hope has had a
profound impact on the district courts. Since July 2010 when the Circuit
56. Latif v. Obama, 666 F.3d 746, 748 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
57. Id. at 748-49.
58. Id. at 779.
59. Id.
60. Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1104-05 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131
S.Ct. 1001 (2011)
61. Id.
62. Esmail v. Obama, 639 F.2d at 1078 (Silberman, J., concurring)(emphasis added).
63. Id.
64. Vladeck, supra note 29, at 1473.
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began issuing its important decisions, district judges have denied 10
habeas petitions in Guantanamo cases and granted none, compared with
22 habeas petitions granted and 15 denied in the two years before that.65
In the 19 habeas appeals the Circuit has decided, the court has never
allowed a prisoner to prevail.66 As The New York Times put it, the "court
has developed substantive, procedural and evidentiary rules that are
unjustly one-sided in favor of the government."67
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has not decided any appeal of any
Guantanamo detainee in the four years since Boumediene was decided in
2008.8 Most recently, it denied certiorari without any dissent in seven
Guantanamo detainee cases, including that of Mr. Latif, prompting The
New York Times to opine that "it is devastatingly clear that the Roberts
court has no interest in ensuring meaningful habeas review for foreign
prisoners. ,,69
The human consequences of the D.C. Circuit's Latif decision and the
Supreme Court's denial of review were not long in coming. Latif was
cleared for release from Guantanamo on three separate occasions,
including 2009.70 Yet his release was blocked, first by Obama's
moratorium on transfers and then by congressional restrictions." It is
doubtful that Administration officials believed that Latif was a threat to
the United States, although undoubtedly for political reasons the

65. Editorial, Reneging on Justice at Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2011, at
SR10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/20/opinion/sunday/reneging-onjustice-at-guantanamo.html.
66. Editorial, The Court Retreats on Habeas, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2012, at A34,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/14/opinion/the-supreme-court-retreats-onhabeas.html.
67. Id.
68. Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 458 (2009). As previously noted, the Court did
initially grant certiorari in Kiyemba v. Obama, to address the question of whether a
habeas court had the power to order a prisoner's release from Guantanamo into the
United States. Prior to oral argument, the government advised the Court that all of the
Uighur petitioners had received offers of resettlement and that some had been resettled
since the grant of certiorari and moved to dismiss the petition. The Court then vacated the
D.C. Circuit's opinion and remanded to the Circuit to reconsider its ruling in light of the
new facts. Kiyemba v. Obama, 103 S. Ct. 1235 (2010). The Circuit reaffirmed its prior
ruling and the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Kiyemba. Kiyemba, 604 F.3d at 1048
(per curiam), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct 1631 (2011).
69. The Court Retreats on Habeas, supra note 66.
70. Editorial, Death at Guantanamo Bay, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2012, at SRIO,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/16/opinion/sunday/death-at-guantanamobay.html.
7 1. Id.
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administration chose to appeal his case.72 Before he was found
unconscious in his cell, Latif had been on a hunger strike, had attempted
suicide, and after he lost his appeal he told his lawyer, "I am a prisoner
of death." 73
Third, in addition to the Circuit's very crabbed reading of habeas
rights at Guantanamo, the Circuit has also issued a number of other
rulings which dramatically restrict the reach of Boumediene and render it
ineffective. The Circuit has refused to apply Boumediene to accord
habeas rights to detainees confined first at Bagram Air Force Base and
now at the Parwan detention facility in Afghanistan, even where the
detainee was captured outside of Afghanistan and brought to Bagram for
detention purposes.7 4 In a unanimous panel decision joined by two of the
more liberal judges on the Circuit - Edwards and Tatel - the Appeals
Court reversed a district court's ruling that the Court did have habeas
jurisdiction for non-Afghan detainees who were apprehended outside of
Afghanistan far from any Afghan battlefield and brought to the theater of
war to be detained for many years at Bagram.7 5 The Circuit held that
since Bagram was considered a war zone, the Boumediene functional test
did not allow detainees to challenge their detention in federal court, and
thus the detainees in Afghanistan were outside the scope of American
judicial review.76 The Al Maqaleh decision has been aptly criticized as
creating a law-free zone or legal black hole as Bagram.77 Similarly, the
Circuit has held that Boumediene only addressed the right to habeas, and
determined that prisoners held at Guantanamo (or elsewhere outside of
the United States) have no due process rights under the U.S.
Constitution.78
Finally, the D.C. Circuit and other circuits have uniformly refused to
decide civil actions against U.S. officials brought by aliens seeking
damages for torture at Guantanamo or elsewhere. 7 9 Perhaps the most

72. See, e.g., Benjamin Wittes, Thoughts on Adnan Latif LAWFARE BLOG (Sept. 12,
2012), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/09/thoughts-on-adnan-latif/. ("Almost nobody
thought that Adnan Latif needed to be in custody at all.... [H]ad Congress not eventually
made it virtually impossible to transfer people from Guantanamo, Latif would not have
remained in custody until his presumably self inflicted death").
73. Azmy, supra note 51.
74. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Editorial, Bagram, A Legal Black Hole?, L.A. TIMES, May 26, 2010, at A20,
availableat http://articles.latimes.com/201 0/may/26/opinion/la-ed-bagram-20100526.
78. Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1027-29 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
79. See e.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), af'd, 532 F.3d
157 (2d Cir.), aff'd, en banc, vacated and supersededon reh'g en banc, 585 F.3d 559 (2d
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troubling example of the courts of appeals' refusal to address claims that
U.S. officials sanctioned torture is the Maher Arar case. Arar, a
Canadian citizen of Syrian descent, was transferring planes at Kennedy
Airport in New York when he was detained by INS agents based on a tip
from the Canadian police that he was a member of al Qaeda.8 0
Questioned repeatedly by the FBI, Arar denied the allegations.' After
two weeks of solitary confinement in Brooklyn, American officials, with
the approval of then U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft, secretly
rendered Arar to Syria, where he was tortured and locked in a damp,
cold, underground cell that Arar termed a "grave" cell because it
measured only three feet wide, six feet long and seven feet high.82 After a
year in detention, the Syrian government released him, concluding that
Arar had no connection to terrorism, and he returned home to Canada.
To this day, Arar suffers severely from his ordeal.84
In 2004, Canada convened a commission to conduct an official
inquiry into the Arar affair.85 In September 2006, the commission issued
a voluminous report fully exonerating Arar of any connection to al
Qaeda or any terrorist group. 86 The Canadian government accepted the
commission's recommendation and officially apologized to Arar and
paid him $11.5 million Canadian dollars as compensation for Canada's
role in his ordeal.87
In January 2004, Arar filed a complaint against various U.S.
officials, including former U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft.88 Arar
sought damages and alleged that the defendants had sent him to Syria for
the purpose of subjecting him to torture and detention there, and had
indeed conspired with Syrian officials to do so. 89 Arar and his lawyers
questioned why the United States would send a man whom it suspected
of being an al Qaeda terrorist to Syria, which the U.S. claimed at the time
Cir. 2009); Rasul v. Myers, 555 U.S. 1083 (2008), aff'd on remand, 563 F.3d 527 (D.C.
Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1013 (2009).
80. Arar, supra note 79, at 252-53.
81. Id. at 253.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 255.
84. Id. at 252-57 (the facts Arar alleged in his complaint are restated in the District
Court opinion in his lawsuit).
85. COMM'N OF INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIONS OF CANADIAN OFFICIALS IN RELATION TO
MAHAR ARAR, REPORT OF THE EVENTS RELATING TO MAHER ARAR 59 (2006).

86. Id.
87. Ian Austen, Canada Will Pay $9.75 Million to Man Tortured in Syria, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 27, 2007, at A5, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/27/
world/americas/27canada.html? r-0.
88. Arar, supra note 79 (the allegations can be found in this complaint).
89. Id. at 256-57.
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was a state sponsor of terrorism that practices torture, and not to Canada,
the United States' friend and ally. 90 The only plausible explanation is that
U.S. officials must have believed that the Syrian government would
detain and use coercive interrogation methods on Arar to obtain
information that the FBI had not been able to acquire, nor would Canada
obtain through using normal police methods. As it turned out, Arar
simply did not have information to provide. Arar argued that since U.S.
officials were constitutionally forbidden from torturing him in New
York, they could not intentionally subject him to torture by outsourcing it
- namely shipping him to Syria to be tortured there. 9 ' Despite Arar's
strong claims on the merits, the District Court, a divided Second Circuit
panel, and a divided en banc Court of Appeals' decision dismissed Arar's
claims.92 Each decision found, under somewhat different reasoning, that
Arar had no Bivens' claim for damages.
The Second Circuit's dismissal of Arar's claims is not exceptional,
but rather the norm. Every other circuit court has also dismissed actions
by aliens or even citizens for torture claims arising out of U.S. officials'
conduct in the "war on terror." 93 For example, the D.C. Circuit also has
dismissed claims of torture brought by aliens.94 Prior to Boumediene, the
D.C. Circuit and district courts in that circuit consistently held that the
constitutional proscription of cruel and inhumane punishment did not
reach U.S. officials who tortured aliens abroad. In Rasul v. Myers, first
decided by the D.C. Circuit just prior to the Supreme Court's holding in
Boumediene, the court reiterated that rule in dismissing a Bivens damage
action brought by former detainees at Guantanamo against high

90. I was one of Arar's lawyers.
91. Arar, supranote 79, at 256.
92. Arar, supra note 79, aff'd, 532 F.3d 157 (2d Cir.), aff'd, en banc, vacated and
supersededon reh'g en banc, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009).
93. See In Re Iraq and Afghanistan Detainee Litig 479 F. Supp 2d 85 (D.D.C 2007);
Harbury v. Deutch 233 F 3d. 596,602-3 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Rasul v. Myers, 512 F.3d 644,
663-65 (D.C. Cir. 2008), vacated and remanded,555 U.S. 1083 (2008), affd on remand,
563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1013 (2009), Lebron v. Rumsfeld
670 F. 3d 540 (4th Cir 2012) , cert. denied 2012 U.S. LEXIS 4422 (2012), Vance
v.Rumsfeld, 701 F. 3d 193 (7th Cir 2012) (en banc), cert. denied 2013 U.S. LEXIS 4438
(2013).
94. Id.
95. See Harbury v. Deutch, 233 F.3d 596, 604 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Boumediene v. Bush,
476 F.3d 981, 984 (D.C. Cir. 2007); People's Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep't of
State, 182 F.3d 17, 22 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ("A foreign entity without property or presence in
this country has no constitutional rights, under the due process clause or otherwise.").
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government officials for alleged torture they suffered during their

detention. 96
The Supreme Court vacated the Rasul dismissal after the
Boumediene decision, ordering the D.C. Circuit to review its decision in
light of Boeumediene.97 However, in Kiyemba v. Obama, the D.C.
Circuit held that the Court's Boumediene decision only involved the
applicability of the Suspension Clause to Guantanamo and did not affect
prior circuit law that stated that the Due Process Clause did not apply to
aliens without property or presence within the United States.98 When the
D.C. Circuit revisited Rasul, it noted that "the Court in Boumediene
disclaimed any intention to disturb existing law governing the
extraterritorial reach of any constitutional provisions, other than the
Suspension Clause." 99 While the court is technically correct that
Boumediene explicitly addressed only the Suspension Clause,
Bouemediene's extended discussion of the Constitution's extraterritorial
reach clearly undermined the circuit's prior holdings that the
Constitution simply did not apply to aliens tortured abroad. The Court's
review of its prior extraterritorial jurisprudence in Boumediene made
clear that "these decisions undermine the Government's argument that, at
least as applied to noncitizens, the Constitution necessarily stops where
dejure sovereignty ends." 00
The D.C. Circuit, however, chose not to rest its decision on the
ground that the Constitution does not apply to torture of aliens abroad,
holding instead that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity,
because reasonable officials would not have known that the prohibition
against torture applies to Guantanamo until at least after Boumediene was
decided in 2008.101 Indeed, the court's dicta suggests that, even now, it is
not clearly established that the constitutional proscription against torture
applies to Guantanamo or any other U.S. military base abroad, and that
U.S. officials who engaged in torture abroad today would still be entitled
to qualified immunity.10 2

96. Rasul v. Myers, 512 F.3d 644, 663-65 (D.C. Cir. 2008), vacated and remanded,
555 U.S. 1083 (2008), affd on remand, 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130
S. Ct. 1013 (2009).
97. Rasul v. Myers, 555 U.S. 1083 (2008), affd on remand, 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir.
2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1013 (2009).
98. Kiyemba, 555 F.3d at 1026-27.
99. Rasul, 563 F.3d at 529.
100. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 755.
101. Rasul, 563 F.3d at 532.
102. Id. at 529 (stating that the circuit's prior law that the Constitution does not apply
to U.S. actions against aliens abroad remains undisturbed by the Supreme Court's opinion
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Thus, despite the landmark victories that detainees won in the
Supreme Court between 2004 and 2008, the overall legal situation seems
bleak. The D.C. Circuit has negated any meaningful judicial remedy for
the Guantanamo detainees, has reviewed detainees' claims under an
exceedingly pro-government standard, has refused to extend
Boumediene's grant of habeas jurisdiction to military bases in
Afghanistan, and has not recognized the application of other closely
related constitutional rights such as due process to the Guantanamo
detainees. Moreover, the D.C. Circuits and other circuits have refused to
allow any claims by aliens seeking accountability for torture to
proceed.'o3 Through all of this judicial narrowing of Boumediene, the
Supreme Court has sat silent, refusing to hear any case involving these
issues through Obama's first term in office. How does one explain this
judicial retreat?
Before answering that question, however, one needs to address the
question at the heart of Goldsmith's analysis: have we established a
system of potentially permanent preventive military detention?"'
Of the remaining prisoners identified as enemy belligerents who the
government believes should be militarily detained at Guantanamo (as
opposed to the numerous detainees who have been cleared for release),
36 have been slated for prosecution before the military commissions.' 05
The remaining 48 detainees being preventively detained, in that there are
no plans to charge them with having committed any crime, but they are
being held as enemy belligerents without trial.10 6 Each was given a
hearing before a military review panel and the government asserts that
they are either al Qaeda or Taliban members or have significantly
supported those organizations., The government does not, however,
explain why any particular individual cannot be tried either in federal
court or even before a military commission; instead, it simply claims that
such a trial is "not feasible."' 0 7
Thus, the government has established a long-term system of
preventive military detention, which Goldsmith terms "remarkable."' 08
What is the legal basis for this system and is it justified?
in Boumediene, with the exception of the Suspension Clause - which does not apply in
some circumstances - remains undisturbed by the Boumediene decision).
103. See generally, supra note 93.
104. See Goldsmith, supra note 6.
105. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ET AL., GUANTANAMO REVIEW TASK FORCE, FINAL
REPORT (JAN. 22, 2010), available at http://wwwjustice.gov/ag/guantanamo-reviewfinal-report.pdf.
106. Id. at 9-10.
107. Id. at 22.
108. Goldsmith, supra note 6.
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II. PREVENTIVE MILITARY DETENTION

Prior to September 1 1 th, the United States relied on federal criminal
prosecution and conviction to incarcerate alleged terrorists. After
September 1 1th, the United States government adopted a warfare model
as the preferred mechanism to preventively detain suspected al Qaeda
and Taliban members, fighters, and supporters. This preventive
paradigm, as John Ashcroft termed it, proved controversial,109 as did
related proposals for the creation of a "National Security Court," or a
"Congressionally sanctioned system of preventive detention," as
proposed by Professors Jack Goldsmith and Neal Katyal." 0
The Bush administration's detention of prisoners at Guantanamo, at
black sites around the world and at Bagram in Afghanistan, was very
controversial. Yet the Obama administration has continued the policy of
indefinite military detentions of al Qaeda terrorism suspects who will
never be charged and tried for any crime - either in federal court or
before a military commission - and the federal courts have accepted and
legitimized this practice. Thus, at present, both the D.C. Circuit and
district courts in the Circuit have affirmed the President's power to
detain people who were a "part of' Al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated
forces."' In Gherebi v. Obama, Judge Walton rejected the argument that
the laws of war do not recognize the indefinite military detention of
insurgents in a non-intemational armed conflict, such as that against Al
Qaeda.1 2 He also rejected the argument that the only individuals subject
to military detention are people who are not merely members of Al
Qaeda, but those who directly participated in hostilities." 3 Judge Walton
substantially agreed with the Obama administration's position that the
government could "detain persons who were a part of, or substantially

109. See, e.g., DAVID COLE & JULES LOBEL, LESS SAFE, LESS FREE: WHY AMERICA IS

LOSING THE WAR ON TERROR (2007) (criticizes the Bush administration's use of the

preventive paradigm).
110. See Jack Goldsmith & Neal Katyal, The Terrorists' Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 11,
2007, at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/11/opinion/Ilkatyal.html.
See also BENJAMIN WITrEs, LAW AND THE LONG WAR: THE FUTURE OF JUSTICE IN THE

AGE OF TERROR 162-66 (2008) (supporting that Congress create a national security
court); Sophia Brill, The National Security Court We Already Have, 28 YALE L. & POLY
REV. 525 (2010) (discussing proposals and the criticism).
I 11. See generally, supra note 93 (cases cited therein are among these decisions).
112. Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d. 43, 55-62 (D.D.C. 2009). For the Center for
Constitutional Rights arguments made in that case, see Majid Khan's Supplemental
Memorandum Regarding the Government's Detention Authority, Khan v. Obama, Civ.
Action No. 06-1690 (RBW) 3/20/2009 (on file with the WAYNE LAW REVIEW).

13. Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d. at 67.
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supported, Taliban or al-Qa[e]da forces or associated forces"l 14 but
limited the term "substantial support" to only those individuals "who
were members of the 'armed forces' of an enemy organization at the time
of their initial detention."' 15 The AUMF detention power was broad
enough to reach al-Qaeda members who were not active fighters, but did
not cover mere "[s]ympathizers, propagandists, and financiers."ll 6
Similarly, in Hamily v. Obama, Judge Batedid not find that providing
"substantial support" sufficed to permit an individual to be detained; he
agreed with Judge Watson that the government could detain those who
were "a part of' al Qaeda, the Taliban, or an associated force."17 Other
judges also adopted the "part of' standard." 8
The D.C. Circuit has not only affirmed the "part of' standard
adopted by these district courts, but also expanded the government's
detention authority. A panel held that the category of persons subject to
indefinite military detention "includes those who are part of forces
associated with Al Qaeda or the Taliban or those who purposefully and
materially support such forces in hostilities against U.S. Coalition
partners.""' 9 The Circuit made it clear that evidence supporting the
military's reasonable belief that a non-citizen seized abroad either
attended Al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan or visited Al Qaeda
guesthouses "would seem to overwhelmingly, if not definitively, justify
the government's detention of such a non-citizen." 20 In sum, as one
scholar put it, "[w]hat has emerged after nearly a decade of habeas
corpus litigation over Guantanamo is a de facto system of indefinite
detention...."l 2'
More recently, Congress has weighed in by enacting legislation to
provide explicit statutory authorization for a system of indefinite military
detention. The National Defense Department Appropriation Act of
2012, at minimum, explicitly reaffirmed President Obama's
interpretation of his authority to detain not only suspected al Qaeda
members and fighters but individuals who have "substantially supported
al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associatedforces that are engaged in hostilities
against the United States. .. ,,122 For aliens who fall within this definition 114. Id. at 53.
115. Id. at 70.
116. Id. at 68.
117. Hamlilyv. Obama, 616 F.Supp.2d 63, 71-76 (D.D.C. 2009).
118. See Awad v. Obama, 646 F.Supp.2d 20, 23 (D.D.C. 2009); see also AI-Bihani v.
Obama, 594 F. Supp. 2d 35, 39 (D.D.C. 2009).
119. Al Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 872 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (emphasis added).
120. Id. at 873, n. 2.
121. See Hafetz, supra note 45, at 148.
122. NDAA § 1021b.
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and the terms "substantially supported" and "associated forces" are not
defined - the presumption of the bill is that they will face indefinite
military detention, rather than criminal arrest and prosecution.
This legitimation of a system of indefinite military detention for al
Qaeda members, supporters or fighters has four basic flaws. First, the
detention power is argued to stem from the laws of war, but those laws
cannot be said to authorize such detention. Second, unlike a traditional
international war where there is high likelihood that prisoners captured in
enemy uniforms on the field of battle are indeed enemy forces, the
current situation reveals a murkier reality; the relationship of the
captured individual to al Qaeda or some "associated force" is at best
unclear. This different reality requires stronger procedural protections
than typical law of war hearings. Third, unlike traditional international
wars, there has been no strong showing that the regular legal process is
unavailable or unworkable and that a preventive detention regime is
necessary. Finally, and most importantly, it is becoming increasingly
clear that the preventive detention regime thus far authorized by the
lower courts has a strong likelihood of not only being indefinite, but also
permanent. To deprive someone of their liberty for what could very well
be their entire lifetime without charging them with any crime or having
the evidence necessary to convict them in a regular court, strikes at the
heart of our core constitutional values and is not what is contemplated by
the laws of war.
First, it is generally agreed that the laws of war do not explicitly
authorize military detention in non-international armed conflict, the
category which the Supreme Court in Hamdan held characterized the
current conflict with Al Qaeda.' 23 The Obama administration correctly
argues that the laws of war "have evolved primarily in the context of
international armed conflicts..." and therefore the Administration seeks
to apply "[p]rinciples derived from law-of-war rules governing
international armed conflicts ... [by analogy to] inform the interpretation
of the detention authority Congress has authorized for the current armed
conflict" against the Taliban, Al Qaeda and associated forces.124 A
vigorous academic and judicial debate has ensued. One view is that
insurgents or fighters in such non-international conflict can be viewed as
combatants or belligerents who can be detained in the same manner as
enemy prisoners in international conflict.125 The other is that they must
be viewed as civilians who can only be detained in certain
123. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630 (2006).
124. Respondents' Memorandum Regarding the Government's Detention Authority
Relative to Detainees at Guantanamo Bay (March 13, 2009), at 1.
125. See infra note 126 and accompanying text.
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circumstances.1 26 The International Red Cross and various international
law scholars have taken the position that in non-international wars, such
as that between a non-state actor like Al Qaeda and the United States,
there is no recognized legal category of enemy combatant.12 7 This view
was adopted by four judges in the Fourth Circuit who participated in the
en banc review in Al Marri v. Pucciarelli, involving the military
detention of a resident alien in the United States who held that the alien
could not be detained as an enemy combatant.12 8 While five circuit
judges in that case found that detention authority existed, they
recognized that the traditional laws of war did not recognize insurgents
in non-international conflict as enemy combatants.12 9 Each proposed a
test for when an individual could be subject to military detention in the
126. See, e.g., Gabor Rona, An Appraisal of US Practice Relating To 'Enemy
Combatants',

10 Y.B. INT'L HUMANITARIAN

L. 232 (2007)

(arguing that under

international humanitarian law "a combatant is someone who by virtue of membership in
the armed forces or associated militia possesses" a privilege or license to kill enemy
soldiers during wartime, and that therefore insurgents or terrorists cannot as a matter of
law be combatants, but must be considered civilians who have engaged in unlawful acts
and may be detained or punished pursuant to domestic, not international law); John
Cerone, Misplaced Reliance on the "Law of War", 14 NEw ENG. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 57,
66 (2007); BENJAMIN WITTEs, LAW AND THE LONG WAR: THE FUTURE OF JUSTICE IN THE

AGE OF TERROR (2008); Laurie R. Blank, A Square Peg in a Round Hole: Stretching Law
of War Detention Too Far, 64 RUTGERS L. REV. 1169 (2011) (current detention "system
stretches the traditional notion of law of war detention beyond its limits"); David Glazier,

Playing By the Rules; Combatting Al Qaeda Within the Law of War, 51 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 957 (2009) (arguing that "good faith application" of the laws of war ultimately
provides better protection for both national security and civil liberties); Monica Hakimi,
A Functional Approach to Targeting and Detention, 110 MICH. L. REv. 1365 (2012);
John B. Bellinger III & Vijay M. Padmanabhan, Detention Operations in Contemporary
Conflicts: Four Challengesfor the Geneva Conventions and Other Existing Law, 105
A.J.I.L 201-02 (2011) (Former Legal Advisor and attorney advisor to the State
Department argue that new law should be developed to address detention in noninternational conflicts.); Ingrid Brunk Weurth, The President'sPower to Detain "Enemy
Combatants": Modern Lessons from Mr. Madison's Forgotten War, 98 Nw. U.L. REV.
1567 (arguing that the "laws of war" as interpreted from history have little significance in
the realities of war and detention today).
127. See Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Official Statement: The Relevance of HL in
available at
2005),
1, 3 (Feb. 21,
at
the Context of Terrorism,
www.ICRC.org/eng/resources/document/mis/terrorism-ihl-210705.htm. See also Rona,
supra note 126; Brief For Amici Curiae Experts in the Law of War in AI-Marri v.
Spagone No. 08-368 United States Supreme Court (2009), at *22-23 (international laws
of war do not "furnish independent authorization for the detention of any defined class of
people as combatants").
128. Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 233 (4th Cir 2008) (en banc) (Motz, J.,
concurring) ("Common Article 3 and other Geneva Convention provisions applying to
non-intemational... conflicts simply do not recognize the "legal category" of enemy
combatant.").
129. Al-Marri, 534 F.3d at 233.
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conflict with Al Qaeda.130 The Supreme Court accepted certiorari in Al
Marri, but the case was dismissed as moot after the detainee was
transferred from military custody to civilian authority for criminal
131
prosecution.
Thus, the argument that detainees at Guantanamo or elsewhere
should be subject to preventive military detention is based not on
existing law, but rather on analogizing the current conflict with Al Qaeda
to that of a traditional war. The Obama administration has claimed that
the Authorization for Military Force (AUMF) provides the executive
with the power to detain individuals whose relationship to Al Qaeda or
the Taliban, "would, in appropriately analogous circumstances in a
traditional international armed conflict, render them detainable."1 3 2
Similarly, two top legal advisors to the State Department during the Bush
administration have recently recognized that the existing international
laws governing detention in conflicts with non-state actors are unclear
and do not provide adequate guidance for states involved in such
conflicts.' 3 3 Thus, adopting the law of war model requires reasoning by
analogy to the rules governing traditional international armed conflict.
However, the analogy to detention of prisoners of war in
international armed conflict that the administration and courts have been
operating on does not work for three fundamental reasons. First, as with
any preventive detention scheme, wartime detention of enemy fighters is
only justified as a departure from normal rules that only permit long term
detention of an individual without trial where there is a strong showing

of necessity.134
130. Id. at 286 (Williams, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("the plurality
opinion may very well be correct that, under the traditional 'law of war', persons not
affiliated with the military of a nation-state may not be considered enemy combatants.");
Id. at 299 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (recognizing that
traditionally, enemy combatants referred to soldiers of a nation state).
131. Al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009).
132. Department of Justice Memorandum of March 13, 2009, at 7 (on file with the
author).
133. Bellinger III, supra note 126 (Former Legal Advisor and attorney advisor to the
State Department argue that new law should be developed to address detention in noninternational conflicts). The International Committee for the Red Cross has also
conducted a study of the changes in warfare that have occurred in the 60 years since the
Geneva Conventions were signed, and identified numerous "gaps or weaknesses in the
existing legal framework," including the detention of persons in non-international armed
conflict. See Jakob Kellenberger, Official Statement of ICRC: Strengthening Legal
Protection for Victims of Armed Conflicts (Sept. 21, 2010), available at
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/ihl-development-statement-210910.
134. See David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists,
and War, 97 CALIF. L. REv. 693, 698 (2009) (preventive detention should only be
available when the government cannot use the criminal justice system to prosecute a
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In traditional international armed conflicts, that necessity exists
because enemy soldiers have committed no crime or misconduct under
national laws of either party to the conflict, nor in most circumstances
will they have committed any violation of international law. Therefore
there is no basis for detention except for that provided by the laws of
war. For example, German soldiers captured during World War II had
committed no crime under U.S. law and could not be prosecuted.135
Soldiers captured during international armed conflict are detained not
because they are criminals, nor because they are generally dangerous, but
to prevent them from returning to the battle on behalf of the enemy
during the course of war. 36
Here, in contrast to the international wars the United States has
fought in the past, anyone who could be detained as an Al Qaeda fighter
under a reasonable test will also, almost by definition, have committed a
crime under U.S. law. Therefore, unlike preventive detention permitted
either domestically or pursuant to the laws of war authorizing the
detention of enemy prisoners of war, the criminal justice system is
theoretically available to prosecute and detain individuals found fighting
for Al Qaeda. The fact that Al Qaeda terrorists can be prosecuted by the
criminal justice system thus removes the linchpin characteristic of all the
current examples of preventive detention.

dangerous individual); See also Adam Klein & Benjamin Wittes, Preventive Detention in
American Theory and Practice, 2 HARV. NAT'L SEC. J. 85, 96 (2011) (characteristic of
modem preventive detention schemes is that preventive "detention is only permissible to
the extent necessary to prevent future harms"). Thus, all preventive detention policies
hitherto recognized in the United States provide for the detention of individuals who
cannot be tried by the normal judicial system because they have committed no crime. The
Supreme Court has allowed the civil commitment of persons who are mentally ill and
dangerous, but have committed no crime and therefore cannot be prosecuted. See
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979). Similarly, U.S. law allows preventive
detention in the form of quarantine to isolate a person with a dangerous disease who
could not be prosecuted criminally. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 586
(1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring). The Court has allowed detention without bail of
persons who have been charged criminally and are deemed to pose a danger to the
community or a risk of flight. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987). Again,
we permit preventive detention in that circumstance because the criminal justice system
cannot instantaneously adjudicate criminal liability, so preventive detention is viewed as
a necessary measure imposed until the criminal process can reach a conclusion.
135. PHILIPPE SANDS, FROM NUREMBERG To THE HAGUE: THE FUTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 31 (2003).
136. Laura M. Olson, Guantanamo Habeas Review: Are the D.C. District Court's
Decisions Consistent with IHL Internment Standards, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 197,
202 (2009) ("Captured combatants, simply because they are opposing combatants, are
interned in order to prevent them from returning to the battlefield.").
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The argument for preventive detention of Al Qaeda suspects,
therefore, is not that it is theoretically impossible to criminally prosecute
Al Qaeda terrorists, but rather that it is impractical, infeasible, or difficult
to do so. Yet there is no solid evidence that it is impractical to prosecute
terrorists in criminal courts.137 Indeed, the evidence is to the contrary. For
example, a well-documented report for Human Rights First, written by
two former federal prosecutors, examines the actual experience of more
than 100 international terrorism cases that have been prosecuted in
federal courts over the past fifteen years. 38 The authors conclude that,
"contrary to the views of some critics, the court system is generally wellequipped to handle most terrorism cases."' 39
However, the interagency task force established by the Obama
administration in 2009 to review the status of the prisoners being held at
Guantanamo concluded that "for many detainees at Guantanamo,
prosecution is not feasible in either federal court or a military
commission." 4 0 The task force gave two main reasons for this
conclusion. The first was that "[w]hile the intelligence about them may
be accurate and reliable, that intelligence, for various reasons, may not be
admissible evidence or sufficient to satisfy a criminal burden of proof in
either a military commission or federal court."' 4 1 The Task Force did not
identify "the various reasons" that such reliable and accurate evidence
would not be admissible in federal court.14 2 The fundamental question
left unanswered by the Task Force is whether such evidence will stand
up to the objective scrutiny that a federal court or traditional military
commission would normally accord in a criminal proceeding.143 Indeed,
a review of the habeas cases such as that of Mr. Latif discussed above,
yields grave doubts as to the Task Force's conclusion that the
"intelligence" against those individuals who can be preventively detained
but not prosecuted is in fact "accurate and reliable," and would meet a

137. See generally Jules Lobel, Preventive Detention and Preventive Warfare: U.S.
National Security Policies Obama Should Abandon, 3 J..of Nat'l Security L. and Pol'y
341, 344-45 (2009) (for a review of the argument that it is practical to try terrorist
suspects in Federal Courts).
138. Richard B. Zahel & James J. Benjamin, Jr., In Pursuit of Justice: Prosecuting
Terrorism Cases in the Federal Courts, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST (May 2008).

139. Id. at 5.
140. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, supra note 105, at 22.

141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 23 (The Task Force did conclude that the "principal obstacles to prosecution
in the cases deemed infeasible by the Task Force typically did not stem from concerns
over protecting sensitive sources or methods from disclosure, or concerns that the
evidence against the detainee was tainted.").
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reasonable test requiring more than the "some evidence" test favored by
judges in the D.C. Circuit.
The Task Force review also concluded that many of the detainees
could not be prosecuted because of "jurisdictional limitations", namely
that there was no evidence that the detainee participated in a specific
terrorist plot, and that they could not be charged with material aid to
terrorism because of the statute of limitations and other jurisdictional
concerns. 14 5 Again, it is unclear why, if the government has reliable,
accurate, and credible evidence that a detainee played a "significant
organizational role within al-Qaida," had extensive training and were
"veteran jihadists with a lengthy involvement in the training camps in
Afghanistan,"l 46 it could not prosecute the detainee for conspiracy to
commit terrorist acts even if there was no evidence tying them to a
specific terrorist plot, and even if a material aid to terrorism prosecution
was not jurisdictionally possible.
In sum, the arguments made by the Task Force seem vague,
inconclusive, and somewhat contradictory. However, even if it is true
that the Task Force could demonstrate that it is legally, as opposed to
politically, unfeasible to prosecute some of the Guantanamo detainees,
there are other detainees that the United States is currently holding
without making that showing. The Task Force was not tasked with
determining whether it is unfeasible to prosecute the 50 or so nonAfghan detainees being currently held by the United States military at
Parwan in Afghanistan who were not captured on any battlefield.
Professor David Cole argues that military detention of Al Qaeda
fighters is justified even if it is feasible to prosecute captured Al Qaeda
fighters. 14 7 He has argued that "the fact that Al Qaeda is engaged in
warfare that is itself a crime should [not] restrict the United States'
options in defending itself."l 4 8 For him, the United States' right to try Al
Qaeda fighters for either war crimes or ordinary crimes does not mean
that we should be "requiredto try them while the conflict continues."l 4 9
But, as he recognizes, "any preventive-detention regime must be
predicated on a showing that criminal prosecution cannot adequately
144. Worthington, supra note 51 (reviewing the Task Force's conclusions in light of
the habeas cases then litigated).
145. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, supra note 105, at 22.
146. Id. at 24.
147. David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and
War, 97 CAL. L. REv. 693, 711 (2009) (emphasis added).
148. Id. See also David Cole, Closing Guantanamo: The Problem of Preventive
Detention, BOSTON REv. (Jan./Feb. 2009), available at http://bostonreview.net/
BR34.1/cole.php.
149. Cole, supranote 147, at 731.
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address a serious problem of dangerousness."' 50 Therefore, it should be
incumbent on those arguing for a wartime preventive detention system
tied to Congress' authorization of force against the September 11
terrorists to demonstrate that the criminal courts cannot, as a practical
matter, prosecute a significant number of detainees against whom it has
clear and convincing evidence are in fact, Al Qaeda fighters. That it
might be more costly or more difficult to do so is insufficient under
Cole's initial premise that preventive detention is only justified where
criminal prosecution "is not a viable option" to addressing a serious
threat. '5 The government has thus far failed to make that showing.
Moreover, the detainees at Guantanamo and Parwan are not treated
as typical prisoners of warfare, but instead are detained in conditions
similar to those used to incarcerate dangerous criminals as opposed to
prisoners of war.152 While the Bush and Obama administrations imported
some of the rules that stem from international warfare, such as the
provision allowing each side to detain prisoners until the end of
hostilities, they explicitly did not incorporate the international warfare
rules providing that detainees were to be treated as prisoners of war
under the Third Geneva Convention and detained in conditions of
confinement consistent with that Convention. 53 Apparently those
provisions of the laws of war were not applicable by analogy. That the
government does not recognize the incorporation of the basic rules
regarding prisoners of war, preferring to treat these prisoners as if they
were dangerous criminals and not traditional prisoners of war, again
suggests the inaptness of the international war model of detention
designed to incapacitate enemy soldiers who have engaged in no criminal
misconduct that merits punitive treatment.
The second distinction between the current conflict with Al Qaeda,
the Taliban and associated forces, and a traditional international war
which makes importing the rules developed in the latter context into this
one difficult, is that in this case, unlike a traditional war, it is not
relatively easy to determine who is an enemy soldier in an international
conflict. Typically, prisoners captured in a traditional war are captured
150. Id. at 698 (emphasis added).
151. Id. at 697.
152. Chris Sands, Prisons' legacy haunts Afghanistan, THE NATIONAL (October 15,
2009),
available at http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/prisons-legacy-hauntsafghanistan (quoting U.S. General Stanley McChrystal about prisons in Afghanistan:
"Committed Islamists are indiscriminately mixed with petty criminals and sex offenders,
and they are using the opportunity to radicalise and indoctrinate them.").
153. George J. Annas, Human Rights Outlaws: Nuremberg, Geneva, and the Global
War on Terror, 87 B.U. L. REv. 427, 451 (2007) ("It is the position of the United States
that the Geneva Conventions do not apply to the prisoners at Guantanamo.").
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on a battlefield, wearing uniforms, and there is no dispute that they are
enemy combatants. That many detainees were captured in nonbattleground situations wearing civilian clothes where the evidence that
they are in fact enemy fighters is quite murky, suggests the need for far
stronger procedural protections before they can be detained than for
those captured in a traditional international war. While spies and other
non-uniformed soldiers have traditionally been captured during
international wars and either prosecuted or detained for the duration of
hostilities, the general rules were developed with the battlefield and
uniformed armies in mind.
As the former Legal Advisor and an attorney advisor to the State
Department under the Bush administration have recognized, the
procedures that ought to be required when someone is captured in a nonstate, non-international conflict are different from those needed in an
international conflict from which the basic rules on detention have been
analogized. This is "because of the high risk of erroneously identifying
individuals as members of non-state groups."15 4
As these former officials note, while the Third Geneva Convention
contains a provision requiring a minimal process for detainees to
determine whether they should be accorded prisoner of war status, the
Geneva Conventions provisions governing non-international conflicts are
silent on the process to be accorded detainees who claim they are
innocent civilians. They write that:
As with the question of who is subject to detention, rules from
international armed conflict are inadequate to fill the gap. In
international armed conflicts most combatants are detained
without any prior process confirming that they are subject to
detention. No such process is needed because most lawful
combatants do not contest that they engaged in belligerent acts.
Unlike nonstate fighters, lawful combatants benefit from
prisoner of war protections linked to their status - a powerful
incentive to admit to that status. Challenges would typically be
futile in any event since combatants [in international wars unlike
non-international wars involving nonstate actors] are so often
captured in uniform, on the battlefield, in the course of
belligerent acts. 55
Thus, importing the rules of international warfare into the current
conflict is inappropriate, where who can be detained and the process by
154. Bellinger III & Padmanabhan, supranote 126, at 221.
155. Id. at 222.
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which they are detained are unclear under international law, and the
circumstances of capture and detention demand more, not less, clarity.
Finally, and most importantly, the military preventive detention
system now in place to detain al Qaeda and Taliban suspects is very
likely to be permanent. Yet the basic international war rule that allows
nations to hold prisoners until the end of hostilities contemplates
detention of a limited duration. The military conflict with Al Qaeda has
now been ongoing for at least 11 years and, despite the death of Bin
Laden and other top leaders, shows no signs of ending any time soon. hn
virtually all other modern warfare - even civil conflicts between
insurgents and governments - there is some prospect of a negotiated
settlement ending the conflict. Here, there is none. Moreover, since Al
Qaeda has morphed into a loose network of affiliated groups in far-flung
nations, there seems little possibility of a definitive military victory over
Al Qaeda, even if the United States were to achieve military success in
Afghanistan and Pakistan or to negotiate some political settlement with
the Taliban. Preventive detention in this circumstance therefore means
the virtually permanent incarceration in harsh conditions of people who
contest their status as belligerents and often are not captured in any
visible battleground, but in civilian areas.
The specter of permanent preventive detention raises a question left
unresolved in Hamdi and Boumediene. In Hamdi, the plurality
recognized that, "if the practical circumstances of a given conflict are
entirely unlike those of the conflicts that informed the development of
the law of war, that understanding [that the President has detention
authority under the law of war] may unravel."l 5 6 Certainly, an unending,
virtually permanent war against Al Qaeda and a far flung and amorphous
decentralized network of "associated forces" throughout the world would
seem to constitute practical circumstances "entirely unlike" the conflicts
which informed the development of the laws of war. Indeed, if as the
Obama administration claims, United States ground forces will leave
Afghanistan in 2014, the "battlefield" that was important for Hamdi's
plurality's conclusion that the President had detention power under the
AUMF as informed by the laws of war, will have virtually evaporated.
Instead, the "war" against Al Qaeda, the Taliban and associated forces
may well amount to sporadic drone firings and other special operations
launched against an assortment of groups and targets around the world
associated with Al Qaeda. At that point, there may not be any "war" for
purposes of the laws of war, and the detainees under that model would
have to be released.
156. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004) (plurality opinion).
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So too, in Boumediene, the Court continually emphasized the lengthy
duration of the conflict with Al Qaeda and of the detentions of the
Guantinamo prisoners, noting that "the cases before us lack any precise
historical parallel." 5 7 The Court ended its Boumediene opinion by again
emphasizing the potentially indefinite and permanent nature of the
conflict against terrorism: "[b]ecause our Nation's military conflicts have
been of limited duration, it has been possible to leave the outer
boundaries of war powers undefined. If, as some fear, terrorism
continues to pose dangerous threats to us for years to come, the Court
might not have this luxury."158
There is broad recognition that the potentially permanent detention
of suspected Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters raises a serious problem of
potentially constitutional dimension. The most prominent solution urged
is to terminate detention authority over individual fighters when the
government concludes that they no longer pose a threat to the security of
the state, as opposed to triggering the end of detention authority on the
conclusion of hostilities.'"9 The Obama administration has essentially
taken this approach, providing for annual administrative reviews to
determine when any particular individual becomes less dangerous so that
he no longer requires detention.' 60 Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith
argue that such individualized reviews are akin to re-conceptualizing the
end of the conflict in terms of the individual rather than the non-state
group. 161 It is also the approach taken in the Fourth Geneva Convention
with respect to civilians who are detained during periods of armed
conflict as a security threat, with the Convention requiring twice annual
reviews of detention decisions of such civilians to determine when the

157. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2262 (2008).
158. Id. at 2277.
159. See Bellinger III & Padmanabhan, supra note 126, at 231.
160. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, Guantanamo Detainee Processes (Oct. 2,
2007), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/Sep2005/d20050908process.pdf (The
Department of Defense defines an Annual Administrative Review as an "[ainnual review
to determine the need to continue the detention of an enemy combatant. The review
includes an assessment of whether the enemy combatant poses a threat to the United
States or its allies in the ongoing armed conflict against terrorist such as al Qaeda and its
affiliates and supporters and whether there are other factors bearing on the need for
continued detention (e.g., intelligence value). Based on that assessment, a review board
will recommend whether an individual should be released, transferred or continue to be
detained. This process will help ensure no one is detained any longer than is warranted,
and that no one is released who remains a threat to our nation's security.").
161. Curtis A. Bradly & Jack Goldsmith, CongressionalAuthorization and the War on
Terrorism, 118 HARv. L. REv. 2047, 2091-92 (2005).
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threat they pose ends.162 These reviews consider the detainee's past
conduct, their level of leadership in the terrorist group, conduct during
confinement, and age, health and psychological profile. 6 3
The difficulty with this approach is the tendency for many
administrative reviews in similar situations to become essentially
meaningless. My experience with supermaximum prisons in the United
States, where prisoners are placed in solitary confinement because they
are believed to pose a serious threat to prison security and safety,
strongly supports recognition of the problematic nature of these reviews.
For many of these supermax prisoners, the periodic administrative
reviews that they are accorded are meaningless, with prison officials
simply saying either that the nature of the original misconduct was
sufficiently egregious as to warrant continued placement in solitary
confinement, or that they do not qualify for release.1'4 Similarly here,
detainees would be at the whim of military officials who could simply
decide that a particular individual was either high level enough, or
considered recalcitrant or an activist in the detention center, and not let
him out, which is likely to occur.
The alternative is to question the whole framework of these military
indefinite - likely permanent - detentions. Although detaining someone
for several years while the conflict that they arguably were involved with
rages may seem reasonable, it seems unreasonable to hold someone for
the rest of their life based on what is often little evidence and contested
facts without the protections of a legitimate trial.
Indeed, it is likely that eventually the Supreme Court will have to
intervene to address the question left unanswered in Hamdi and
Boumediene: does the Constitution permit the establishment of a system
of essentially permanent military detention which cannot be viewed as
authorized under the traditional laws of war?
III. EXPLAINING WHY THE BOUMEDIENE VICTORY HAS LED TO THIS
BLEAK SITUATION FOR THE REMAINING GUANTANAMO DETAINEES

The situation painted in Parts I and II of this article illustrate a
disconnect between the "landmark" victories the CCR and its co-counsel
won in Rasul and Boumediene and the continued detention under harsh
162. Using the Fourth Geneva Convention suggests adopting the conceptual
framework that these detainees are legally civilians - as the law of non-international
conflict seems to suggest - and not combatants, as the Obama and Bush Administrations
have argued.
163. Bellinger III & Padmanabhan, supra note 126, at 231-32.
164. Austin v. Wilkinson, 189 F.Supp.2d 719, 752 (2002).
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conditions of prisoners held by the United States military. Guantanamo
and Afghanistan. The D.C. Circuit and district courts have permitted the
Executive to continue indefinite military detention at Guantanamo based
on a weak evidentiary standard, and can provide essentially no
meaningful relief even if a detainee wins their habeas claims. The Circuit
has also permitted indefinite military detention at Bagram/Parwan with
no judicial review whatsoever.165 Congress has explicitly authorized
military detention and hindered relief even for those detainees cleared for
release or transfer to other countries.'66 The Supreme Court has refused
to intervene for four years.16 7 Why has this disconnect occurred?
Various scholars have offered explanations. These theories revolve
around dichotomies between theory and practice, or process and
substance, or rights versus remedies. For example, Professor Kim
Scheppele writes in a recent article entitled "The New Judicial
Deference" that Boumediene and other recent cases represent a "new sort
of [judicial] deference" based on the dichotomy between principled
victories and practical losses.' 68 While the old judicial deference allowed
the government to win national security or wartime cases through the
judiciary's refusal to intervene, Boumediene represents a new deferential
position where "governments win first by losing these cases on principle
and then by getting implicit permission to carry on the losing policy in
concrete cases for a while longer, giving governments a victory in
practice." 6 9 The detainees got70 inspiring rhetoric while the government
"got the facts on the ground."'1
For Professor Scheppele, the contradiction between theory and
practice isn't based on practical or political resistance to the Court's
decision, but is contained within the judicial opinion itself, which
integrates inspiring rhetoric paired with a lack of detail and instructions
as to how to implement the decision. "The new judicial deference means
that both sides win - with one side getting the right in theory while the
other side gets the reality on the ground, each authorized by different
aspects of the same judicial decision."' 7 ' According to Scheppele, a wide
gap exists "between suspected terrorists' legal gains and their unchanged
165. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (2010).
166. Janet Cooper Alexander, Jurisdiction-Strippingin the War on Terrorism, 2 Stan.
J. Civ. RTs. & Civ. LIBERTIES 259, 289 (2006) ("Under the DTA, there is no habeas for
complaints about conditions of confinement").
167. Id.
168. Kim Lane Scheppele, The New Judicial Deference, 92 B.U. L. REV. 89, 93
(2012).
169. Id. at 93.
170. Id. at 91.
171. Id. at 158.
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fates."1 72 Her analysis also invokes the right/remedy dichotomy, claiming
that the Court boldly articulated that the detainees have important rights,
but "provided few immediate remedies." 7 3
Professor Jenny S. Martinez draws attention to the Supreme Court
and lower courts focus on process as opposed to substance in the "war on
terror" cases in an attempt to answer the question posed by her client
Jos6 Padilla,"[w]hy is it that litigation concerning the alleged enemy
combatants detained at Guantanamo and elsewhere has been going on for
more than six years and almost nothing seems to have actually been
decided?" 74 According to Martinzez, the Court's procedural focus
allowed it to delay resolution of controversial substantive claims, which
may have practical advantages, but comes at a significant human cost to
the detainees.
Closely related to Martinez's procedural/substance dichotomy,
Professor Stephen Vladeck offers another duality to describe the Court's
post-9/11 jurisprudence in terrorism cases - passive/aggressive
behavior.175 He claims that "by repeatedly asserting their authority only
to routinely sidestep the merits, the Court has been neither passive nor
active, but passive-aggressive," and argues that this approach has its
distinct dangers. 176 Similarly, Professor Richard Fallon has echoed
Martinez's argument, claiming that the "juxtaposition of the Court's
assertiveness in upholding judicial jurisdiction with its reticence
regarding substantive rights." 77

172. Id.
173. Id. at 91. Linda Greenhouse has noted the same gap between principle and facts
on the ground when in a 2009 article she sought to tackle what she termed the 'mystery
of Guantanamo Bay', asking "how can it be that nearly seven years after the first
detainees arrived at the prison there- after numerous courtroom battles, the most
significant of which resulted in defeats for the Bush Administration's position- not a
single detainee has ever been released, by order of any court or any other body in a
position of authority, against the wishes of the Administration? How is it, in other words,
that after all this time, all this spinning of wheels and running place, nothing has
happened?" See Linda Greenhouse, The Mystery of Guantanamo Bay, 27 BERKELEY J.
INT'L L. 1, 2 (2009). Greenhouse attributes this disconnect to the interconnection of a
hard line Executive position which radicalized the Court combined with an inherent
judicial cautiousness which failed to understand that the Executive would not respond to
gentle nudges.
174. Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the "War on Terror," 108 COLUM.
L. REv. 1013 (2008).
175. Stephen I. Vladeck, The Passive-Aggressive Virtues, Ill COLUM. L. REV. Sidebar
122, 127 (2011).
176. Id.
177. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, Habeas Corpus, and the War on
Terror:An Essay on Law and PoliticalScience, 110 CoLuM. L. REV. 352, 391 (2010).
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Professor Vladeck has also articulated another related theory to help
explain the disconnect between the Court's bold assertiveness in
Boumediene and the paucity of the substantive rules it has developed to
address the detainee situation. The Court, according to Vladeck, has
acted mainly to preserve the Court's role and judicial power over these
detentions, and not primarily in support of the detainees' rights.178
Separation of powers considerations are paramount, and not rights.17 9
From this perspective, Boumediene achieved what the Court really
wanted: to inform the Executive that the Court had a role to play in this
area, and the Executive could not operate totally outside the reach of the
judiciary. As long as the judiciary had a role to play in the separation of
powers scheme, the courts would interfere only minimally with the
substantive policies that the Executive had put in place at
Guantanamo. 8 0
All of these explanations make sense and accurately describe the
Court's detainee jurisprudence. However, something deeper is at work
underlying the dichotomous jurisprudence that has boldly asserted a
judicial role over the detainees, yet permitted a preventive detention
scheme with only minimal substantive and procedural safeguards to be
put in place at Guantanamo. The Boumediene contradictions reflect
broader forces at work than just those involving the Guantanamo
detainees, but are symptomatic of the general approach of domestic and
foreign courts in this type of litigation.81
Consider the Canadian Supreme Court's decisions in the case of
Omar Khadr, a Canadian citizen who was captured in Afghanistan by
American forces and brought to Guantanamo at the age of 15.182 Khadr's
178. Vladeck, supra note 175.
179. Id.

180. Stephen I. Viadeck, Boumediene's Quite Theory: Access to Courts and the
Separation of Powers, 84 NOTRE DAME L. Rav. 2107, 2111 (2009) (arguing that the
injury the statute [removing habeas review] inflicted upon the role of the courts was at
least relevant, if not central, to the constitutional analysis); see also Greenhouse, supra
note 173, at 8-9.Greenhouse quotes an exchange between Supreme Court Justice Breyer
and United States Solicitor General Olson at the Rasul argument that supports this view.
Breyer expressed concern that the Bush Administration's position excluded the judiciary
totally and led to unchecked executive power violative of the constitution's separation of
powers restraints. He suggested to Olson that the Court could take jurisdiction and
resolve the problem of unchecked power. Yet Justice Breyer held out "the possibility of
really helping you with what you are most worried about ... by shaping the substantive
right to deal with all those problems ... that you are worried about." Breyer's solution
presaged what has in fact happened: allowing the Guantanamo prisoners to "get their foot
in the door," but then working out the substantive rights to allow the government to do
what it wants with some minimal protections in place. Id. at 8-9.
181. See id.
182. Canada (Justice) v. Khadr, 2008 SCC 28, para. 19 [2008] 2 S.C.R. 125 (Can.).
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Canadian lawyers sought an order requiring the Canadian government to
disclose documents relating to interviews conducted by Canadian
officials at Guantanamo.' 83 The Canadian government argued that the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Duties did not apply extraterritorially. 84
A unanimous Canadian Supreme Court rejected that argument, holding
that "if Canada was participating in a process that was violative of
Canada's binding obligations under international law, the Charter applies
to the extent of that participation."' 85
Two years later in 2010, the Canadian Supreme Court reiterated its
previous holding in the Khadr case and issued declaratory relief that
Canada had violated the Charter in participating in Khadr's detention.186
Nonetheless, that assertive holding led to no relief for Khadr, who was
detained at Guantanamo until the United States finally released him in
2012.'8 At the same time that the Canadian Court held that Canada had
violated the Charter, it also reversed a lower court order requiring
Canadian officials to seek Khadr's repatriation to Canada because of the
incompleteness of the evidentiary record, "the limitations of the Court's
institutional competence," and the need to respect the foreign policy
powers of the Executive."8
Moreover, a subsequent case decided by the Canadian Federal Court
of Appeal appeared to significantly limit the Khadr rulings.1 89 In
Amnesty InternationalCanada v. Canada, a unanimous court of appeal
distinguished Khadr in holding that the Charter did not apply during the
armed conflict in Afghanistan to the detention of non-Canadians by the
Canadian forces, nor to their transfer to Afghan authorities even if such
transfer exposed them to a substantial risk of torture.1 90 The Canadian
Supreme Court refused to hear Amnesty International's appeal.19 1
The Canadian Court can thus be seen as paralleling the actions of the
United States Supreme Court. First, it boldly asserted jurisdiction over a
Guantanamo case. 192 Then, it offers no substantive relief, finally refusing
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Canada (Prime Minister) v. Khadr, 2010 SCC 3, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 44 (Can.).
187. Omar Khadr leaves Guantanamo to return to Canada, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(September 29, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/sep/29/omar-khadrguantanamo-canada.
188. Khadr, 2010 SCC 3, para. 46 [2010] 1 S.C.R. 44, para. 46 (Can.).
189. Amnesty Int'l Can. v. Canada (Chief of the Def Staff), 2008 FCA 401, [2009] 4
F.C.F. 149 (Can.).
190. Id.
191. Amnesty Int'l Can. v. Canada, [2009] 1 F.C.R I (Can.).
192. See id.
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to review lower court decisions declining to extend the Court's rationale
beyond its limited holding and ,arguably, in contradiction to the central
thrust of the Supreme Court's rationale.1 93
The Israeli Supreme Court has also operated in a similar fashion. In a
celebrated, landmark opinion, the Supreme Court held that various forms
of interrogation employed by the Israeli military against Palestinian
detainees constituted cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment.' 9 4 Yet
the practices of Israeli forces engaging in these inhumane interrogation
practices have not ceased, despite numerous Palestinian complaints of
continued torture.195 Indeed, out of over 700 complaints lodged by
Palestinian detainees alleging cruel and inhumane treatment subsequent
to the Israeli Supreme Court decision, not one has resulted in any
prosecution or disciplinary action taken against Israeli military
officials. 196 Thus, the Israeli torture case illustrates a similar disconnect
between soaring legal rhetoric and relatively unchanged facts on the
ground. It provides yet another foreign example of similar
passive/aggressive judicial behavior that the U.S. Supreme Court has
exhibited in Boumediene and its sequel.
Perhaps even more directly relevant is the Supreme Court's decision
in Wilkinson v. Austin, a case involving a challenge to Ohio's policies
with respect to the detention of what Ohio termed the "worst of the
worst" prisoners at its supermaximum prison, Ohio State Penitentiary
(OSP).19 7 The legal situation at Guantanamo has eerie parallels to the
situation of prisoners housed in supermaximum solitary confinement
facilities in the United States. In Wilkinson - a case I argued before the
Supreme Court just a year after Rasul was decided - the Supreme Court
held that prisoners in the Ohio Supermax had a liberty interest in
avoiding placement in long-term solitary confinement at that facility
because of the draconian nature of the confinement.'9 8 Therefore, they
had to be given a due process hearing before being transferred to the
193. See id.
194. Public Committee Against Torture v. State of Israel, H.C. 5100/94 (Israel 1999).
195. PCATI Report, Accountability Still Denied: Periodic Update (January 2012)
196. Id. (reporting that as of the end of 2010, over 700 domplaints of torture had been
lodged by Palestinians and that not one had led to a criminal investigation). More
recently in August 2012, the Israeli Court decided a group of petitions brought by PCATI
and other human rights organizations, criticizing the Israeli government's mechanism for
investigating complaints of torture, but again providing no direct relief to the victims of
torture and not requiring that any specific criminal investigation be initiated. See HCJ
1265/11, The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel et al. v. The Attorney General
Petition for Granting of order nisi (Decision delivered Aug. 6, 2012).
197. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209,210 (2005).
198. Id. at 220.

2013]

VICTORY WITHOUT SUCCESS?

I155

supermax and required periodic reviews of their solitary confinement.' 9 9
It also flows from the decision that since these prisoners had a liberty
interest, they had a right to at least some judicial review of the State's
decision to send them to the supermax.200
Yet, the Court went on to hold that the nature of the process to be
provided could be minimal, with no witnesses provided and nothing like
an actual trial or typical administrative hearing. 20 1As in Bounediene, the
Wilkinson Court announced a strong statement of the liberty interest
involved and provided for some process and review, but limited its
holding to the facts of the Ohio facility involved and required that only
minimal process be accorded the prisoners. 20 2 The Wilkinson holding, in
many respects, mirrors the Guantanamo litigation, for as Professor
Scheppelle noted in that context, it contained within the opinion both
important rhetoric on liberty (in this case the articulation of a liberty
interest) and language that would limit the practical usefulness of the
right involved. As a result, the Supreme Court Wilkinson decision was
purely procedural - while the District Court had imposed certain
substantive limitations of the prison officials' discretion to place
prisoners in long-term solitary confinement for minor infractions, the
Court of Appeals had already reversed that ruling.203 Also, while the
District Court's holding had in fact resulted in over 400 prisoners being
released from solitary at the supermax, the Supreme Court's ruling has
proved to have had only minor effect on prison officials' behavior in
placing large numbers of prisoners in solitary confinement, irrespective
of whether they have committed major misconduct in prison, and
effectively warehousing prisoners in solitary without any real way out.204
For example, California has now held over 500 prisoners in
draconian solitary confinement at Pelican Bay Penitentiary for over a
decade with no end in sight.205 Virtually all of these are gang members the internal security equivalent of terrorists internationally - and they are
being held in solitary confinement often simply because of the people
they have associated with, the literature they read, the artwork they

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id. at 224.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 229.
Id.
James Ridgeway & Jean Casella, Cruel and usual: US solitary confinement, AL
JAZEERA
(Mar.
19,
2011), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/03/
201137125936219469.html.
205. See Ashker v. Governor Brown, Second Amended Complaint Case No. 4:09-cv05796-CW (N.D. Cal. 2012).
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possess in their cells, or the ideological views they hold, and not for any
acts of violence they committed while in prison. 20 6

Perhaps the best example of the broader contradictions contained in
the Guantanamo litigation stems from Brown v. Board of Education.
Brown was a great victory for the NAACP and the rights of African
Americans to be free from segregated education, and has been hailed as
"perhaps the most important judgment ever handed down by an
American Supreme Court." 2 07 However, as the distinguished legal
historian Paul Finkleman has noted, it is ironic that 50 years after the
decision, "many scholars and some civil rights activists regard the
decision as a failure." 20 8 Harvard civil rights professor Charles Ogletree
concludes, " that fifty years after Brown there is little left to celebrate," 209
while the great civil rights activist and professor Derrick Bell wrote that
"[b]y dismissing Plessy without dismantling it, the Court seems to
predict if not underwrite eventual failure." 2 10 Or as Bell put it, the
passage of years has transformed the Brown ruling "into a magnificent
mirage, the legal equivalent of that city on a hill to which all aspire
without any serious thought that it will ever be attained." 2 1 1
Indeed, twenty years ago, Professor Gerald Rosenberg's book, The
Hollow Hope, set off a firestorm by arguing that Brown had virtually no
effect in ending racial discrimination or racial segregation. 212 For
Rosenberg, the failure of Brown to have any direct or even indirect effect
on segregation was symptomatic of a broader inability of courts to be
effective in producing social change. 2 13 Rosenberg concluded, "U.S.
courts can almost never be effective producers of significant social

206. Id.
207. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE WARREN COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 15

(1998).
208. Paul Finkelman, Civil Rights in Historical Context: In Defense of Brown, 118
HARv. L. REV. 973, 974 (2005) (book review).
209. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., All Deliberate Speed: Reflections on the First Half
Century ofBrown v. Board of Education, at XV (2004).
210. DERRICK A. BELL JR., IN WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE
SAID: THE NATION'S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA'S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS

DECISION 185, 199 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001).
211. See DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS,

BROWN V. BD. OF EDUCATION AND THE

UNFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 4 (2004);

see also Id. at 6 ("Brown brought about

transformation without real change").
212. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? (2d. ed. 1991).

213. Id.
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reform." 2 14 To him, "courts act as 'fly paper' for social reformers who
succumb to the 'lure of litigation'."215
On the fiftieth anniversary of Brown, Professor Michael J. Klarman
published a massive study of the Supreme Court's role in ending racial
discrimination, also minimizing the effects of the decision.2 16 For
Klarman, the Supreme Court played a relatively minor role in changing
race relations in the country.2 17 The Court's constitutional interpretation
generally reflects the social and political climate of the times, and racial
change was coming in the 1950s irrespective of Brown.2 18 As a legal
decision, Klarman argues that Brown failed to accomplish much, and that
its main achievement was to radicalize Southern politics, resulting in
white backlash and violence against civil rights activists, which
ultimately rallied national opinion behind civil rights.219
Rosenberg and Klarman's books produced a vigorous debate about
the role of Brown and of judicial review more generally. 2 20 For example,
various scholars have disputed Rosenberg's view that Brown
accomplished nothing and that litigation is counterproductive, correctly
pointing out the indirect effects of Brown.22 1
Yet it is indisputable that the Brown decision itself produced little
change in the decade that followed it. The Court boldly proclaimed that
segregation of schools by race was unconstitutional but provided no
remedy in the decade after Brown.222 The Supreme Court intervened
sparingly between 1954 and the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,2 23
214. Id. at 422.
215. Id. at 427.
216. MICHAEL J.

KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004).

217. Id.
218. Id. at 5-6, 468.
219. Id. at 385.
220. See, e.g., Finkelman, supra note 208, at 1018 ("it is impossible to imagine the
civil rights revolution having succeeded so quickly in sweeping away de jure segregation
without Brown"); see also LEVERAGING THE LAW: USING THE COURTS TO ACHIEVE SOCIAL
CHANGE (David A. Schultz ed., 1998) (evaluating Rosenberg's thesis and in part
criticizing it); Peter H. Schuck, Public Law Litigation andSocial Reform, 102 YALE L.J.
1763 (book review 1993) (criticizing Rosenberg's thesis); Stephen L. Carter, 90 MICH. L.
REv. 1216, 1221 (1992) (Rosenberg "gives short shrift to the [Brown] decision's vital
importance as a confidence building device for those who were fighting for reform);
Brendon Swedlow, Reason for Hope? The Spotted Owl Injunctions and Policy Change,
34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 825, 849 (2009) ("the owl litigation shows that US courts can
produce significant policy change").
221. Id.
222. ROSENBERG, supra note 212.
223. The Court issued only three full opinions in the area of school segregation in
those ten years, despite the massive resistance of the South to integration. The most
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As of the passage of that Act in 1964, Brown had resulted in only 2.3%
of Black Children in the south attending schools with whites.224 It was
only after Congress and the President implemented strong measures
supporting southern school desegregation, that the Southern resistance to
integrated schools was broken.225
Perhaps by mandating the end only to State imposed intentional
discrimination, Brown can be viewed as legitimating the ongoing
structural, de-facto, societal discrimination that continues to plague our
country.226 As Professor Louis Michael Seidman has written, Brown
"served [to] legitimate current arrangements."227 Indeed, Brown is now
cited by the Court to reverse at least some of the integration that has
occurred over the past several decades, with some justices arguing that
any affirmative action or the use of race to integrate society runs afoul of
the race neutrality imposed by Brown. 2 28
The broader explanation for the disconnect between the Court's great
pronouncements in Boumediene and the judiciary's failure to provide
meaningful review or relief to many Guantanamo detainees and its
legitimation of a system of preventive detention must be found not in
specific judicial doctrine, or the Court's procedural versus substantive
rulings, or even in the Court's inclination to preserve its own role as
opposed to the detainees rights. Rather, the contradictory legacy of
Boumediene and Rasul thus far is more fundamentally the result of a
deep-rooted limitation of rights-based litigation, for rights cannot be
divorced from politics nor can litigation be viewed independent of the
social and political context in which it is brought.
The Guantanamo litigation is simply one more illustration of that
broader perspective. From this perspective, the cause of the failures in
the Guantanamo litigation does not reside in any court announced
doctrine, or the recalcitrance of the D.C. Circuit, but in the consensus of
important of these, Cooper v. Aaron, upheld the role of the Court and required southern
communities to obey the decisions of the Court as part of the supreme law of the land.
ROSENBERG, supra note 212, at 43-44.
224. Dunn, Title VI, the Guidelines, and School Desegregation in the South, 53 Va. L.
Rev. 42,44 n.9 (1967).
225. Id.
226. Richard Thompson Ford, Brown's Ghost, 117 HARv. L. REv. 1305, 1306 (arguing
that Brown didn't accomplish what most American's believe it did: "What happened (or
didn't)? The simple answer is that a lot more than de jure discrimination was, and
tragically still is, keeping the races segregated. Many private individuals, families, and
institutions of civil society desired and still desire segregation; deprived of direct state
support, they found other means for perpetuating it.").
227. Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CALIF. L. REv. 673, 717 (1992).
228. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S.
701, 778 (2007).
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the national security elites and the three branches of government that we
need a preventive detention scheme to continue to hold captured Al
Qaeda and Taliban suspects where prosecution might be difficult. This
consensus has been challenged by human rights groups, but not by any
grass roots movement of the American people, who generally do not
seem particularly concerned by what is happening now at Guantanamo or
at the other main detention center at Parwan, Afghanistan. Joseph
Margulies and Hope Metcalf, who were counsel in the detainee cases,
have reached a similar conclusion. In an important article, they argue that
legal scholars and lawyers had a flawed understanding of the role of
litigation and the courts in response to the Bush administration's "war on
terror" policies. 2 29 The legal academy erroneously focused "on what
Stuart Scheingold called 'the myth of rights' - the belief that if we can
identify, elaborate and secure judicial recognition of the legal 'right,' the
political structures and policies will adapt their behavior to the
requirements of the law and change will follow more or less
automatically." 230 For them, the explanation for what the courts have
done or failed to do in the post-9/ 11 context must be grounded in the
political realities of our time, not in doctrinal or structural arguments. 231
Indeed, as various scholars have noted, the confluence of a number
of political factors in 2009 through 2010 underlay the failure of Obama
to close Guantanamo and the consolidation of a wartime preventive
detention regime there.2 32 The Republicans in Congress and former Bush
administration officials waged a concerted pushback against any attempt
to close Guantanamo, and more broadly to move away from the military
detention model.233 Obama and his advisors did not vigorously contest
these moves, wanting to appear strong on national security and fighting
terrorism. 234 Indeed, on certain issues such as the moratorium on
transferring Yemeni detainees, the Obama administration acted even
before Congress did. During this critical juncture, polls of the American
people showed that support for closing Guantanamo had plummeted
from a majority of the population when Obama was elected, to less than
40% a year later.235 While the Court's procedural, jurisdictional decisions
in Rasul and Boumediene permitted the consolidation of the current
system of preventive detention at Guantanamo, the political context of
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Marguilies & Metcalf, supra note 7, at 437.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Frakt,supra note 20.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see Marguilies & Metcalf, supra note 7.

160

THE JOURNAL OF LAW IN SOCIETY

[Vol. 14

the last four years is what fundamentally underlies its approval by the
courts.
IV. RASUL, BOUMEDIENE AND THE LEGITIMATION
OF PREVENTIVE DETENTION

The great legal paradox of our time that Jack Goldsmith has claimed
to uncover thus appears not so paradoxical, unique, or great at all.
Indeed, this paradox reflects the contradiction of much public interest,
law reform litigation, including Brown v. Board of Education, and a host
of other important decisions. Just as the CCR's Guantanamo litigation
may have served to legitimate a system of wartime preventive detention
and strengthen the national security state, Brown undoubtedly can be
argued to have legitimized continued societal and non-intentional
"neutral" policies that perpetuate and reinforce a racially unequal and
divided society. So too, one can view CCR's and the ACLU's Austin v.
Wilkinson litigation, which successfully imposed due process restrictions
on Ohio's transfer of prisoners to supermax facilities, as possibly helping
to legitimate prolonged solitary confinement,236 which the litigators who
brought that case opposed. Moreover, as some of the examples set forth
in part III illustrate, litigation often results in a disconnect between the
rights recognized by the court and the realities on the ground, leading the
judicial decision to serve in effect as cover for the continuation of the
challenged practice.
What Goldsmith uncovered is not a great paradox unique to the
Guantanamo litigation, but rather the limitations and contradictions of
law and litigation as an instrument of social change. That does not mean
that the CCR's litigation failed or that it should not have been brought. It
simply requires a recognition that litigation is constrained by political
and social reality, and that as successful as the CCR's litigation was, it
was always unlikely to produce the result the lawyers were really seeking
without a dramatic change in the political climate. As Joe Margulies puts
it, even though Rasul was a "failure," "there was no choice but to
litigate.... His mistake, for which he takes sole responsibility, was to
believe that law, in an intensely legalistic society was enough."2 37

236. Wilkinson v. Austin, 549 U.S. 209, 229 (2005) (For example, Justice Kennedy's
opinion in Wilkinson v. Austin suggests that for at least some prisoners, prolonged
solitary confinement in a supermax facility might be the State's only alternative.).
237. See Marguilies & Metcalf, supra note 7, at 471.
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A few years ago, I wrote a book titled Success Without Victory, and
a series of law review articles on similar themes. 23 8 This scholarship
looked at losing cases in American history and argued that even if the
court battle resulted in a legal "loss," the litigators and movements they
represented often used the litigation to achieve some political success.
My work drew on the writing of social scientists such as Michael
McCann, Stuart Schiengold and Joel Handler, who argued that while
judicial decisions by themselves rarely lead to social change, the indirect
effects and uses of litigation may be its most important aspects for social
movements seeking change. This social science scholarship argues, in
the words of one scholar, "although litigation by itself may not always
produce immediate and sweeping results, it can function as part of an
effective political strategy for achieving social reform."239
Several points emerge from this scholarship that are relevant to the
Guantanamo litigation. First, the legal battle cannot be isolated from the
political process. Losing litigation can have an important effect on that
process, by engendering favorable publicity, by highlighting injustices or
by providing leverage to supplement other tactics and strategies. So too,
winning litigation must be combined with a political movement, because
the litigation alone often does not produce the change the litigants desire.
Second, the line between success and failure, winning and losing is
not as clear as American law and culture pretends it is. Losing cases
often have successful outcomes, and winning cases can often be viewed
as failures through some lens.
Third, the struggle for justice is a long road, and victory, success,
losing, and defeat cannot really be understood except in the long
trajectory of history. Americans tend to have a very short attention span
and view victories and defeats, as well as the weakening or strengthening
of national security, through a short-term lens.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, one crucial aspect of many
losing legal battles is that they contributed to and helped inspire what I
term a "culture of resistance" or a "culture of struggle. 240 This culture of
238. See generally JULES LOBEL, SUCCESS WITHOUT VICTORY: LOST LEGAL BATTLES
AND THE LONG ROAD TO JUSTICE IN AMERICA (2003) [hereinafter SUCCESS WITHOUT
VICTORY]; Jules Lobel, Courts as Forums for Protest, 52 UCLA L. REV. 477 (2004);
Jules Lobel, Losers Fools and Prophets,Justice as Struggle, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1331
(1995) [hereinafterLosers Fools and Prophets].
239. SUSAN GLUCK MEZEY, PITIFUL PLAINTIFFS: CHILD WELFARE LITIGATION AND THE
FEDERAL COURTS 5-6 (2000).
240. See SUCCESS WITHOUT VICTORY, supra note 238, at 267 (these litigators'
"contribution to a culture of resistance to injustice provides the essential meaning of their
actions"); see also Losers Fools and Prophets, supra note 238, at 1336 (losing efforts
contribute to a "culture of struggle").
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resistance uses law and litigation as one method of resisting injustice;
what is critical is not the outcome, rather it is the decision to resist by
whatever means are available. Often, as in the CCR's Guantanamo
litigation, law was perhaps the most viable means of resistance available
given the hostility of the political process.
Just as losing cases can have a certain success, the Guantanamo
litigation also reminds us that victorious cases have their failures. What
both of these dialectical opposites - success without victory, or victory
coexisting with failure - illustrate is the complex, contradictory, and
nuanced reality in which litigation subsists. Goldsmith's great paradox of
our time only constitutes one aspect of this larger reality.
Goldsmith's failure to recognize the general contradictory and
complex nature of law and reality leads him to erroneous conclusions.
First, he elevates the judicial role by suggesting that the courts played a
major role in legitimating the current system of preventive detention. In
fact, while the lower courts have indeed upheld wartime preventive
detention for Al Qaeda suspects, the Supreme Court has not, but has
acquiesced in the current state of affairs by not taking any cases for
review. Moreover, President Obama's speech in May 2009 set forth the
necessity for preventive detention for some of the Guantanamo detainees,
which meant that the basic policy underlying Guantanamo would
continue even if the place of detention was changed. 24 1 That speech was
given before the courts upheld preventive detention for Al Qaeda
detainees.
Goldsmith is correct that because of CCR's litigation, the Executive
detention policies have been subjected to some aspects of the rule of law,
which did play a significant role in legitimating them. Yet undoubtedly,
the Bush administration and certainly the Obama administration would
have been forced by political pressure to set up some system of hearings
to review the detainees' status, which would have accorded the
detentions more legitimacy than existed in 2002. For example, even
though the D.C. Circuit held that detainees held in Afghanistan have no
access to habeas corpus, the administration has claimed to have
strengthened the procedural protections for the detainees held there in an
attempt to legitimize the detentions. Contrary to Goldsmith's analysis,
the continued detention of 86 prisoners now at Guantanamo, who the
Executive branch agrees should be transferred consistent with U.S.
interests but are still imprisoned there, cannot be viewed as legitimate.
This detention is the subject of continuing criticism in the media and
241. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on National Security at the
National Archives (May 21, 2009).
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elsewhere.
This injustice continues not because of judicial
legitimation, but because the political branches have stymied their
release and there is not sufficient political opposition among the
population to successfully challenge the detentions.
Second, Goldsmith's view takes a short term perspective on the
situation at Guantanamo. Enormous contradictions still abound there.
While the current situation allows the Executive to detain people he
believes are dangerous (and some who even the administration admits
are not particularly dangerous, such as Mr. Latif), in the long term,
pressure will undoubtedly build both in the courts and in the political
arena to address those contradictions. For example, if United States
forces do withdraw from Afghanistan in 2014 and large scale fighting
involving the United States ends, the continued detentions of prisoners
will be increasingly untenable under a traditional law of war model, and
will take on a greater look of permanence. In that context, the Supreme
Court may have to confront the questions left open in Hamdi and
Boumediene about the outer limits of the Executive detention power. The
answer it gives may not be one that Goldsmith and other supporters of
Executive detention power consider to be supportive of the national
security interest of the United States. CCR's litigation has started a
process of engaging the courts on this issue; at this time the endpoint in
that process cannot be predicted nor may it turn out in the long run to
legitimate Executive power.
Finally, and most fundamentally, Goldsmith ignores the role of the
Rasul/Boumediene litigation in aiding resistance to unjust detention
policies. Goldsmith apparently cabins such resistance into the box of
executive accountability, arguing that pressure on the Executive Branch
forces it to be more accountable. However, resistance also contains the
possibility of challenging the key national security policies that the
Executive and Congress support, and undermining those policies. By
helping to create a culture of resistance to these unjust policies, the CCR
cases in the long term may well undermine and not legitimate a national
security framework that is at odds with basic human rights, democratic
values, and a peaceful world order. Over the long term, these cases are
likely to aid resistance to the national security state and undermine its
legitimacy, an effect Goldsmith refuses to recognize.
While Goldsmith is inaccurate in his view that the main role of
CCR's litigation has been to strengthen the national security state, the
limitations of law, rights, and litigation that underlie Goldsmith's
242. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LETTER TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE LEON PANETTA

(2012), available at http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/04/09/letter-secretary-defense-Ieonpanetta-repatriate-or-resettle-detainees-cleared-trans.
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analysis have important implications for how litigators should litigate
these cases and how scholars should analyze them. Margulies and
Metcalf argue that an understanding of the limitations of rights-based
litigation requires that we "re-imagine" our intellectual endeavor and
"knock law from its lofty perch;" presumably litigators "should be more
attuned to the limitations of the judiciary, and mindful of the complicated
tendency of narratives to generate backlash and counter-narrative." 2 43
While they are unclear exactly what this means for litigators, they argue
that the "ability to fashion the superior legal argument is most useful
insofar as it increases the value for the political resource for one narrative
or another." 244 This suggests that litigators must view their litigation not
simply in terms of the courtroom battle, but as a tool for impacting the
political debate.
Perhaps the most important insights can be gleaned from Professor
Muneer Ahmad's work. Ahmad represented Omar Khadr for a time
before the Bush Military Commissions, and comes to a similar
conclusion as Margulies and Metcalf. According to Ahmad, "the work of
rights is important but limited ... [and] the mere existence of rights is not
enough to do justice." 245 Ahmad disputes the view of the Guantanamo
litigation held by some commentators and litigators as transformative transforming the law and bringing about justice. He argues, "that instead
of expecting rights-based legal contest at and around Guantanamo to
produce transformative results, we might better understand it as a form of
resistance to dehumanization."24 6
Ahmad's perspective is similar to the one I expressed in Success
Without Victory, that the key point of much social justice litigation is to
resist oppression and not simply to get a judicial recognition of rights. In
this way, Ahmad's perspective is very different from the "rule of law"
viewpoint that was common amongst the lawyers involved in the habeas
Guantanamo petitions.2 47 Ahmad analogizes the rights-based litigation of
lawyers with the hunger strikes of prisoners - claiming that they may be
more alike than dissimilar.248 Both serve not to transform Guantanamo or
to establish the rule of law there, but rather "as resistance, a way of not
necessarily stopping the violence of the state, but of making it more
243. Margulies & Metcalf, supra note 7, at 471.
244. Id. at 464.
245. Ahmad, supra note 5, at 1686.
246. Id. at 1687.
247. See, e.g., Laura Fletcher, Alexis Kelly and Zulikah Aziz, Defending the Rule of
Law, Reconceptualizing Guantanamo Habeas Attorneys, 44 CoNN. L. REV. 617, 668
(2012) (asserting that "the Guantanamo bar sought to establish procedural rights for
detainees as part of a needed defense of the rule of law").
248. Ahmad, supra note 5, at 1760.
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costly. Rights claims can be understood as a domesticated hunger strike,
a rhetorical, abstracted, and comparatively unmessy form of engaging

state power." 2 49
Professor Ahmad and I agree that there are several benefits from
perceiving court challenges such as the Guantanamo litigation as
resistance centered rather than transformative. First, it allows the lawyer
to take a longer term approach to litigation, viewing the litigation not
simply to achieve a specific transformative decision, but rather to
commit the lawyer and client to a "long-term oppositional stance, and a
set of daily practices of objection and contravention."250 Second, it
provides a broader political and social context for particular litigation
over specific rights. In general, such a resistance frame looks at the
litigation as one aspect of a broader political and social struggle whose
victory might be aided by the court but will require the sustained effort
of a resistance movement. Such a long-term resistance perspective will
provide the psychological sustenance that will aid the lawyers and clients
in preserving over legal defeats and political defeats. Finally, by
acknowledging the contradictions contained in the litigation process, a
resistance perspective also aids in countering the almost inevitable
legitimating function of the litigation.
Ultimately, various scholars, litigators, and media outlets drew
important lessons from the CCR's Guantanamo litigation. The New York
Times' take on the CCR's victory in Rasul was reflected in its story a few
days after that case was decided, headlined "Scrappy Group of Lawyers
Shows Way for Big Firms." 2 5 1 For the Times and many others, the key
lesson seemed to be that a small, "scrappy" group of lawyers could take
on the Executive, and fighting almost alone could win. As the article
points out, at the beginning the CCR felt "very isolated," and the
courtroom struggle seemed hopeless.25 2 However, they did win, despite
daunting odds, and then the big law firms were beating down the doors to
become involved in the habeas litigation. By taking the risk of losing, by
fighting what appeared to be a hopeless battle, the CCR was able to win
an astonishing victory.
Goldsmith's lesson is, of course, far more pessimistic. Yes, the CCR
won a great victory, but it lost the war. Its landmark victories in Rasul
249. Id.
250. Id. at 1762.
251. Adam Liptak & Michael Janofsky, Scrappy Group of Lawyers Shows Way for Big
Firms, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2004, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/
06/30/world/threats-responses-advocates-scrappy-group-lawyers-shows-way-for-big-firms.
html.
252. Id.
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and Boumediene simply legitimized policies with which the human rights
community fundamentally disagreed.
This Article draws a different lesson than that of The New York
Times article and Goldsmith. While the Times story does express the
important lesson that one can fight for justice despite great odds against
success and sometimes win, the more significant point is that it is
important to resist injustice despite the ultimate outcome. Whether one
wins or loses, and how one defines success or failure is obviously
important, but not decisive. It is the act of resistance - whether by filing
a lawsuit, demonstrating in the streets, protesting before Congress, or
engaging in a hunger strike - that over the long term will contribute to a
culture of resisting oppression which has the potential to topple dictators,
undermine an undemocratic national security state, or transform an
unjust society.

